How and Why Race Continues to Influence the  Administration of Criminal Justice in Louisiana by Smith, Robert J. & Sarma, Bidish J.
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 72 | Number 2
Winter 2012
How and Why Race Continues to Influence the
Administration of Criminal Justice in Louisiana
Robert J. Smith
Bidish J. Sarma
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
Robert J. Smith and Bidish J. Sarma, How and Why Race Continues to Influence the Administration of Criminal Justice in Louisiana, 72 La.
L. Rev. (2012)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol72/iss2/2
  
How and Why Race Continues to Influence the 
Administration of Criminal Justice in Louisiana 
Robert J. Smith and Bidish J. Sarma∗ 
In the final analysis, though, I am bound to enforce the laws of 
Louisiana as they exist today, not as they might in someone’s 
vision of a perfect world. That is what I have done. And that is 
what I must continue to do. 
Reed Walters, district attorney in LaSalle Parish responsible for 
prosecuting the Jena Six (Justice in Jena, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 
2007). 
 
[These laws] do not on their face discriminate between the 
races, and it has not been shown that their actual administration 
was evil; only that evil was possible under them. It follows, 
therefore, that the judgment [upholding these laws] must be 
affirmed. 
Unanimous opinion of the United States Supreme Court in 
Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213, 225 (1898), which upheld 
property qualifications, educational qualifications, and other 
means explicitly designed to prevent African Americans from 
being qualified to vote. 
INTRODUCTION 
On May 12, 2010, we went to the Louisiana Supreme Court to 
argue on behalf of a death row inmate in State v. Dressner.1 The 
case emerged from Jefferson Parish, Louisiana. At trial, the 
prosecution used its peremptory challenges to exclude seven of 
                                                                                                             
  Copyright 2012, by ROBERT J. SMITH AND BIDISH J. SARMA. 
 ∗ A significant portion of this Article originates from three sources. See 
Bidish J. Sarma, An Enduring (and Disturbing) Legacy: Race-Neutrality, Judicial 
Apathy, and the Civic Exclusion of African-Americans in Louisiana, 1 HLRe 49 
(2011); G. Ben Cohen & Robert J. Smith, The Racial Geography of the Federal 
Death Penalty, 85 WASH. L. REV. 425 (2010); G. Ben Cohen & Robert J. Smith, 
Choosing Life or Death (Implicitly), in IMPLICIT RACE BIAS ACROSS THE LAW 
(forthcoming 2012). We view this Article as a culmination of our recent writing on 
race and the criminal justice system, and an opportunity to discuss our personal 
experiences as practicing death penalty lawyers in Louisiana. 
 1. Bidish Sarma and Robert Smith served as co-counsel for Dustin 
Dressner on direct appeal of his capital conviction.  
362 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72 
 
 
 
nine qualified prospective black jurors.2 Only one person of color 
ultimately sat on the jury, despite the fact that African-American 
residents constituted approximately 25% of the population in the 
Parish.3 Four years earlier, attorneys from our office urged the 
Louisiana Supreme Court to reverse another case out of Jefferson 
Parish where the State had struck every one of the five qualified 
prospective black jurors. The prosecutor in that case told reporters 
that it was his “O.J. [Simpson] case” and later pleaded with jurors 
not to let Allen Snyder get away with it like O.J. did.4  
While briefing and arguing Dressner, we recognized that the 
distance between the post-Reconstruction legacy of racism in 
Louisiana and the present day administration of justice—much like 
the distance between the quote from the Supreme Court’s opinion 
in Williams v. Mississippi and the statement from Reed Walters—
is not as far as one may wish to believe.5 The prosecutor at Mr. 
Dressner’s trial had gone so far as to suggest that he struck 
African-American prospective jurors because they espoused views 
that were friendly to the State. Nevertheless, the Louisiana 
Supreme Court denied the claims of prosecutorial race 
                                                                                                             
 2. See Unpublished Appendix at *8 n.8, State v. Dressner, 45 So. 3d 127 
(La. 2010) (No. 08-KA-1366) (on file with authors). 
 3. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, State & County QuickFacts: Jefferson 
Parish, LA, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/22/22051.html (last visited 
Oct. 13, 2011); see also RICHARD BOURKE, JOE HINGSTON & JOEL DEVINE, LA. 
CRISIS ASSISTANCE CTR., BLACK STRIKES: A STUDY OF THE RACIALLY 
DISPARATE USE OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES BY THE JEFFERSON PARISH 
DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE (2003), available at http://www.blackstrikes. 
com/resources/report/black_strikes_report_september_2003.doc.  
 4. See State v. Snyder, 942 So. 2d 484, 498–99 (La. 2006), rev’d, Snyder 
v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472 (2008). The Louisiana Supreme Court upheld Mr. 
Snyder’s conviction and rejected the claim of racial discrimination, but in 
Snyder v. Louisiana, a 7–2 opinion authored by Justice Alito, the Supreme Court 
of the United States reversed. Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472 (2008). 
 5. Indeed, in the atrium of the Louisiana Supreme Court, a portrait of 
Ernest Benjamin Kruttschnitt prominently hangs directly to the left of the main 
entrance. E.B. Kruttschnitt was the legal architect of a system that was designed 
to ensure the “supremacy” of the Anglo-Saxon race through terms that would 
avoid the scrutiny of “Massachusetts” judges. OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF 
LOUISIANA: HELD IN NEW ORLEANS, TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 8, 1898, at 381 
(1898) [hereinafter LOUISIANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION JOURNAL]. In 
1898, more than 25 years after the Reconstruction Amendments provided 
African-American citizens with the right to participate in their government, 
Louisiana held its second Constitutional Convention. Serving as its President, 
Kruttschnitt called into order what he deemed to be “little more than a family 
meeting of the Democratic party of the State of Louisiana.” Id. at 8–9. In the 
end, he vowed to “protect the purity of the ballot box and to perpetuate the 
supremacy of the Anglo-Saxon race in Louisiana.” Id. at 381. 
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discrimination, rejecting them in an unpublished appendix.6 Yet, 
the question of whether the State continues to discriminate because 
of skin color ought not be buried or forgotten.7 Indeed, the racial 
disparities reflected across a number of criminal justice contexts in 
Louisiana warrant fresh inquiry.8 
This Article seeks to add texture to the analysis of how and 
why race influences the criminal justice system. It considers three 
mechanisms that exclude black citizens from jury service at a 
disproportionate rate and thus dilute their influence: (1) non-
unanimous jury verdicts; (2) discriminatory peremptory 
challenges; and (3) death-qualification. It details how African 
Americans are systematically disenfranchised from participating in 
the administration of justice and why these processes drive 
substantively unequal outcomes. The Article’s aim is primarily 
descriptive. Part I provides the contemporary context, setting out 
the racial disparities that pervade Louisiana’s criminal justice 
system. These outcomes are largely a result of the processes that 
are numbered above and explored in the four parts that follow. Part 
II explores how the laws enacted by nineteenth-century white 
supremacists continue to operate today, and do so—regardless of 
modern intent—in a way that executes their intended 
discriminatory purposes. Part III discusses the State’s use of 
peremptory challenges. These challenges do not stem from 
discriminatory origins but nonetheless perpetuate racial exclusion. 
Part IV describes the racial impact that death-qualification has on 
juries’ composition in capital cases. Part V concludes, observing 
that these factors are both interdependent and mutually reinforcing. 
Each factor causes negative feedback loops that inhibit the ability 
of minority group members to participate meaningfully in the 
justice system and exact political change.  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                             
 6. See generally Unpublished Appendix, Dressner, 45 So. 3d 127 (La. 
2010) (No. 08-KA-1366) (on file with authors). 
 7. See Smith v. United States, 502 U.S. 1017, 1020 n.* (1991) (Blackmun, 
J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (“The fact that the Court of Appeals’ 
opinion is unpublished is irrelevant. Nonpublication must not be a convenient 
means to prevent review. An unpublished opinion may have a lingering effect in 
the [jurisdiction] and surely is as important to the parties concerned as is a 
published opinion.”). 
 8. See infra Part I. 
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I. THE OUTCOMES TRIGGERING THE DEEPER INQUIRY: RACIAL 
DISPARITIES PERMEATE LOUISIANA’S CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
In Louisiana, racial disparities permeate the criminal justice 
system.9 African-American citizens are significantly 
overrepresented in the criminal justice system.10 Within the subset 
of society’s most serious criminal offenses—homicides (including 
first-degree murder, second-degree murder, and manslaughter)—
prosecutors disproportionately seek the death penalty against 
African Americans, and juries disproportionately sentence African 
Americans (especially those accused of murdering white victims) 
to execution.11 And, at the same time the system locks up and 
harshly sentences racial minorities, it also ensures they are under-
represented or unrepresented on criminal juries.12 State action 
plays a significant role in creating and maintaining these racial 
disparities. 
A. Incarceration Rates and Disparate Policing 
The United States incarcerates a greater percentage of its 
citizens than any other country.13 Louisiana is the epicenter of the 
trend:14 it incarcerates 1 in every 55 adults, more than any other 
state in the nation.15 If one includes every person that is under the 
control of the corrections system in Louisiana, whether they be 
incarcerated, paroled, or on probation, the number climbs to 1 in 
                                                                                                             
 9. See discussion, infra, Part I.A–C. 
 10. See, e.g., LA. DEP’T OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS, 
CORRECTIONS SERVICES, Fact Sheet: Demographic Profiles of the Adult 
Correctional Population (June 30, 2011), available at http://www.corrections. 
state.la.us/wp-content/uploads/stats/2a.pdf. 
 11. See, e.g., Glenn L. Pierce & Michael L. Radelet, Death-Sentencing in 
East Baton Rouge Parish, 1990–2008, 71 LA. L. REV. 647 (2011). 
 12. See, e.g., Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472 (2008). 
 13. See, e.g., INT’L CENTRE FOR PRISON STUDIES, Entire World—Prison 
Population Rates per 100,000 of the national population, http://www.prison 
studies.org/info/worldbrief/wpb_stats.php?area=all&category=wb_poprate (last 
visited Oct. 12, 2011); NICOLE D. PORTER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, THE STATE 
OF SENTENCING 2010: DEVELOPMENTS IN POLICY AND PRACTICE 1 (Feb. 2011), 
http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/publications/Final%20State%20of%
20the%20Sentencing%202010.pdf.  
 14. See David Crary, Study: Louisiana Has the Highest Incarceration Rate, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 18, 2008), available at http://www.pachiefprobation 
officers.org/docs/panews3_28_8.pdf. 
 15. PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, ONE IN 31: THE LONG REACH OF 
AMERICAN CORRECTIONS tbl. A-4 (Mar. 2009), http://www.pewcenteronthe 
states.org/uploadedFiles/PSPP_1in31_report_FINAL_WEB_3-26-09.pdf. 
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every 26 adults.16 Before Hurricane Katrina, New Orleans itself 
had more people in its local prison per capita than any other major 
city in the United States.17 The increasing prison population is 
relevant because the State continues to disproportionately 
incarcerate racial minorities, especially its black citizens. Over 
70% of all prisoners in Louisiana are African-American, despite 
the fact that African Americans constitute 32% of the State’s 
population.18  
These disparities can be seen in patterns of racialized policing. 
The now-deceased Jefferson Parish Sheriff Harry Lee19 famously 
told reporters: “We know the crime is in the black community. 
Why should I waste time in the white community?”20 A March 
2011 Department of Justice Report on the New Orleans Police 
Department noted “troubling disparities in [the] treatment of the 
City’s African-American community,” and concluded that the 
“NOPD has failed to take sufficient steps to detect, prevent, or 
address bias-based profiling and other forms of discriminatory 
policing on the basis of race . . .”21 A major consequence of racial 
profiling is the disproportionate arrest rate of black citizens—and 
                                                                                                             
 16. Id. at tbl. A-6. 
 17. NAT’L PRISON PROJECT OF THE ACLU, ABANDONED AND ABUSED: 
ORLEANS PARISH PRISONERS IN THE WAKE OF HURRICANE KATRINA 13 (2006), 
http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/prison/oppreport20060809.pdf. 
 18. See William Arp III & Berlisha Morton, A Political History and 
Analysis of Disenfranchisement and Restoration of the Black Vote in Louisiana, 
29 W.J. BLACK STUD. 629, 630 (2005) (“More than 72.9% of the incarcerated in 
Louisiana are Black, 26.9% are Whites, and 0.2 % represents the ‘Other’ 
category.”); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, State & County QuickFacts: Louisiana, 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/22000.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2011). 
 19. Sheriff Harry Lee is also largely responsible for the searing images of 
armed guards blocking New Orleans residents desperately trying to escape the 
floods of Hurricane Katrina from crossing the Crescent City Connection Bridge 
into Jefferson Parish. See, e.g., Bruce Eggler, Bridge Blockade After Katrina 
Remains Divisive Issue, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE, Sept. 1, 2007, available at 
http://blog.nola.com/times-picayune/2007/09/bridge_blockade_after_katrina. html 
(“Not only did the blockade spawn state and federal investigations and five 
lawsuits targeting Gretna, its police force, Lawson, Jefferson Parish Sheriff Harry 
Lee and other law enforcement agencies, the episode vaulted the New Orleans 
area’s historical struggle with race and class onto an international stage.”). 
 20. See, e.g., John Burnett, Larger-Than-Life Sheriff Rules Louisiana 
Parish, NPR, Nov. 28, 2006, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php? 
storyId=6549329. Sheriff Lee ordered his Deputies to stop and question “young 
blacks in rinky-dink cars” driving in white neighborhoods. See Brief of Amicus 
Curiae Louisiana Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers for Petitioner, 
Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472 (2008) (No. 06-10119). 
 21. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, INVESTIGATION OF THE 
NEW ORLEANS POLICE DEPARTMENT 35, 32 (Mar. 16, 2011), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/nopd_report.pdf. 
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thus higher absolute number of black citizens swept into the 
system—for drug crimes. One in four inmates (27.6%) in 
Louisiana is incarcerated for a drug offense.22 In New Orleans, 
drug use and other non-violent crimes account for as much as 45% 
of the population of pre-trial prisoners at the notoriously 
overcrowded Orleans Parish Prison at any given time.23 Though 
drug use nationally is roughly consistent among white and black 
individuals,24 black citizens are significantly over-represented for 
drug arrests.25 This translates into more black citizens, and 
particularly young, black men, being arrested, taken away from 
their communities, and coming home with felon status that makes 
obtaining employment and voting incredibly difficult,26 and 
serving on a jury impossible.27 The problem is apparent not only in 
Orleans Parish and Jefferson Parish, but statewide.28  
                                                                                                             
 22. LA. DEP’T OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS, CORRECTIONS 
SERVICES, Fact Sheet: Demographic Profiles of the Adult Correctional 
Population (30 June 2011), available at http://www.corrections.state.la.us/wp-
content/uploads/stats/2a.pdf. 
 23. James Austin, Wendy Ware, & Roger Ocker, Orleans Parish Prison 
Ten-Year Inmate Population Projection tbl. 13 (Nov. 2010), www.ncjrs.gov/ 
pdffiles1/nij/grants/233722.pdf (showing that drug possession represents 3.8%, 
drug sales represent 8.7%, theft, fraud and forgery represent 4.7%, “other 
property” represents 1.6%, and “other nonviolent” offenses represent 26.7%).  
 24. SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, 
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,  RESULTS FROM THE 2008 
NATIONAL SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH: NATIONAL FINDINGS 25 (2009), 
http://www.oas.samhsa.gov/nsduh/2k8nsduh/2k8Results.pdf. 
 25. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DECADES OF DISPARITY: DRUG ARRESTS AND 
RACE IN THE UNITED STATES 16 (Mar. 2009), http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/ 
files/reports/us0309web_1.pdf. 
 26. No person under an order of imprisonment for conviction of a felony 
can vote. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:102(A)(1) (Supp. 2011). Although 
Louisiana law provides for the restoration of voting rights to individuals 
convicted of felonies who are no longer under parole or probation, see LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 18:177(A) (2004), the task of restoring the right to vote in practice 
is much more difficult than the law’s text suggests. See, e.g., Traci Burch, 
Turnout and Party Registration among Criminal Offenders in the 2008 General 
Election, 45 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 699, 707 (2011) (“[T]he economic and social 
burdens associated with criminal convictions severely restrict the ability of 
offenders to garner resources such as time, money, and civic skills that would 
help them participate in politics after they serve their time.”). Moreover, the 
state cannot provide any meaningful information about the restoration of rights. 
See Arp & Morton, supra note 18, at 636 (“The lack of data regarding 
restoration of felons’ right to vote suggests Louisiana’s indifference towards the 
restoration of voting rights.”). 
 27. See, e.g., Craig Haney & Philip Zimbardo, The Past and Future of U.S. 
Prison Policy: Twenty-Five Years After the Stanford Prison Experiment, 53 AM. 
PSYCHOL. 709, 716 (1998). 
 28. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
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B. Death Row 
Racial disparities also reach the administration of the ultimate 
punishment. Louisiana’s death row is 65% black,29 which means it 
has a greater percentage of African Americans than any other state 
with at least ten people sentenced to die by execution.30 Recent 
research in two Louisiana parishes responsible for a significant 
percentage of the state’s total death sentences indicates that the 
race of the victim is a statistically significant factor in determining 
who receives the death penalty.31 Although empirical evidence 
suggests that African Americans have committed a higher 
percentage of the homicides in Caddo and East Baton Rouge 
Parishes than whites, it also demonstrates that a very small 
percentage are sentenced to death for black-on-black killings, and a 
much higher percentage face the death penalty for interracial 
homicides.32 The disparities that defined Louisiana’s death penalty 
history are not an artifact33 but continue to haunt capital 
punishment in the state today. 
C. Jury Participation 
Black citizens continue to be excluded from jury service in 
Louisiana, especially in the most serious criminal cases. In capital 
cases, it is not uncommon for juries to include zero or one black 
person, despite dramatically higher African American 
representation in the parish population.34 For instance, in an 
amicus brief to the United States Supreme Court in Snyder v. 
Louisiana, a group of African-American ministers observed that 
                                                                                                             
 29. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROJECT OF THE NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, 
DEATH ROW U.S.A. 35 (Winter 2010), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/ 
documents/DRUSA_Winter_2010.pdf; see also LOUISIANA DEP’T OF PUBLIC 
SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS, CORRECTIONS SERVICES, Fact Sheet: Demographic 
Profiles of the Death Row Correctional Population (30 June 2011), available at 
http://www.corrections.state.la.us/wp-content/uploads/stats/2d.pdf. 
 30. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 29, at 35–36. 
 31. See Pierce & Radelet, supra note 11; Tim Lyman, Comparing Homicides 
to Capital Cases Caddo Parish, 1988–2008 (2011) (unpublished comment), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1743712.  
 32. See Pierce & Radelet, supra note 11, at 658, 661; Lyman, supra note 31, 
at 2, 3. 
 33. See, e.g., Pierce & Radelet, supra note 11, at 652–54 (summarizing the 
racial history of Louisiana’s death penalty). 
 34. See, e.g., Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 475–76 (2008) (all-white 
jury); Unpublished Appendix at *8, State v. Dressner, 45 So. 3d 127 (La. 2010) 
(No. 08-KA-1366) (on file with authors) (one African-American juror); State v. 
Draughn, 950 So. 2d 583, 604 (La. 2007) (one African-American juror); State v. 
Harris, 820 So. 2d 471, 475 (La. 2002) (one African-American juror). 
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race discrimination in Jefferson Parish capital cases was the norm 
rather than the exception: 
In capital murder cases such as Snyder’s, the problem has 
been particularly stark. As reflected in available decisions 
and Louisiana Supreme Court records, Jefferson Parish 
prosecutors struck all or all but one qualified African-
American venirepersons in eleven capital cases, including 
Jacobs and Harris. These prosecutions occurred both before 
and after Allen Snyder’s trial. In a twelfth case, the 
prosecutors attempted to strike all but one qualified African 
American, but the trial judge intervened and ordered that a 
second African-American venireperson be seated.35  
Similarly, a group of ministers in Caddo Parish recently 
objected to the repeated discrimination in jury selection in capital 
cases in that Parish, noting that black citizens represent almost 
50% of the population but often times constitute only 25% of 
capital juries.36 These trends also exist in non-capital cases. A 
recent report by the Equal Justice Initiative, for instance, 
documents that 80% of criminal trials in Jefferson Parish have no 
effective black representation given that non-unanimous verdict 
rules permit ten white jurors to effectively ignore the voice of one 
or two jurors who are members of racial minority groups.37  
The process by which black citizens are excluded is multi-
faceted. Residents who do not have a permanent address may not 
receive jury summons or meet the baseline residency 
requirement.38 Those who cannot arrange transportation or find 
childcare may not arrive at the courthouse in the first place, or may 
be excused for hardship.39 Residents who have been convicted of a 
felony and remain unpardoned are disqualified.40 Black citizens 
                                                                                                             
 35. Brief of Nine Jefferson Parish Ministers as Amici Curiae for Petitioner 
at 8–9, Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472 (2008) (No. 06-10119).  
 36. See Motion of Amici Curiae for Leave to File Memorandum in Support 
of Defendant’s Application for Subpoena Duces Tecum, Louisiana v. Tucker, 
No. 273,436 (La. 1st Jud. Dist. Ct. 2011) (seeking review of jury demographics 
to understand this disparity).  
 37. EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, ILLEGAL RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN JURY 
SELECTION: A CONTINUING LEGACY 5 (Aug. 2010), http://www.law.berkeley. 
edu/files/IllegalRacialDiscriminationJurySelection.pdf [hereinafter ILLEGAL 
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION]. 
 38. See LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 401(A)(1) (Supp. 2011) (requiring 
residency). 
 39. See LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 783(B) (2003) (allowing jurors 
suffering hardship to be excused at the trial court’s discretion). 
 40. See LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 401(A)(5) (Supp. 2011). 
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tend to be disproportionately represented in these circumstances.41 
Once black citizens arrive at the courthouse, prosecutors often use 
challenges to eliminate a disproportionate number of black 
jurors.42 These varied factors result in limited participation of 
African-American jurors on criminal juries.  
D. The Overall Picture 
These racial disparities—consistent across a number of 
contexts, from striking jurors on the basis of their race to arrests 
for suspected drug crimes to imposition of death sentences—reflect 
that race continues to matter in Louisiana’s criminal justice system. 
This observation may not surprise people familiar with the 
incarceration statistics or who have personal experience with the 
system. But, the claim that official decision-makers either hold 
overt racial animosities or stand idly by knowing that the criminal 
justice system treats black residents differently than white residents 
has not inspired systemic change. Some skeptics downplay the 
significance of the claim.43 These commentators characterize our 
nation as a “Post-Racial America,” and refer to counter-typical 
examples, like Barack Obama becoming the first black President of 
the United States,44 or Bobby Jindal becoming the first non-white 
Governor of Louisiana since Reconstruction,45 as evidence.46 
                                                                                                             
 41. See generally Paula Hannaford-Agor, Systematic Negligence in Jury 
Operations: Why the Definition of Systematic Exclusion in Fair Cross Section 
Claims Must Be Expanded, 59 DRAKE L. REV. 761, 772–77 (2011). 
 42. See infra Part III. 
 43. See, e.g., Lydia Saad & Frank Newport, Blacks and Whites Differ About 
Treatment of Blacks in America Today, GALLUP NEWS SERVICE 58 (July 6, 
2001), http://www.gallup.com/poll/4585/blacks-whites-differ-about-treatment-
blacks-america-today.aspx. 
 44. See, e.g., Abigail Thernstrom & Stephan Thernstrom, Editorial, Racial 
Gerrymandering Is Unnecessary, WALL ST. J., Nov. 11, 2008, at A15 
(suggesting “the doors of electoral opportunity in America are open to all”).  
 45. Alex Spillius, Is Bobby Jindal Presidential Material?, THE TELEGRAPH, 
May 5, 2008, http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/alexspillius/3934721/Is_Bobby_ 
Jindal_presidential_material/ (“Jindal . . . is ‘post-racial’ in a very Obamian 
fashion.”). 
 46. Perhaps the mind boggling and extended “birther” debate about 
Obama’s birth certificate will put to rest any notion that his election marked the 
end of racial bias in American electoral politics. See, e.g., Eric Hahman et al., 
Evaluations of Presidential Performance: Race, Prejudice, and Perceptions of 
Americanism, 47 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 430 (2011); Leonard Pitts 
Jr., Birther Debate Has Racist Undercurrent, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 31, 2011 
(decrying the debate as “profoundly racist claptrap”). 
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Bobby Jindal himself made a similar statement47 on the night he 
became the first Indian Governor elected in the history of the 
United States: “In America, the only barrier to success is a 
willingness to work hard and play by the rules.”48 
Unfortunately, a willingness to work hard and play by the rules 
is not the only prerequisite for the type of civic engagement49 that 
promotes positive intergenerational change.50 The racial disparities 
in arrests and sentencing in Louisiana are real, as are the practices 
that dilute the participation of black citizens in the rendering of 
justice. A narrow understanding of how society works generally, 
and how the criminal justice system functions specifically, will not 
serve the state well. And, the issue is not primarily that Louisiana 
residents harbor explicitly racist views.51 To chalk up these 
recurring racial disparities solely to allegedly racist actions by 
legislators, police officers or prosecutors would be inaccurate and 
                                                                                                             
 47. Governor Jindal also once said of Louisiana, “You know, this has been 
a great place to grow up. The great thing about the people of Louisiana is that 
they accept you based on who you are.” Keshni Kashyap, The Bobby Jindal 
Racism Issue, THE DAILY BEAST (Mar. 4, 2009), http://www.thedailybeast.com/ 
blogs-and-stories/2009-03-04/the-bobby-jindal-racism-puzzle/. 
 48. Billy Sothern, Bobby Jindal: Not Much to Celebrate, THE NATION, Oct. 
29, 2007, available at: http://www.thenation.com/article/bobby-jindal-not-
much-celebrate. In order for Governor Jindal to believe the words he spoke, he 
had to have  
looked past the fact that many of the people exposed to that crisis 
[Hurricane Katrina] were willing to work and play by the rules; their 
road to success, however, was barred by an education system ranked 
among the worst in the country, streets filled with violent crime and 
few decent-paying jobs for those who did manage to escape all of the 
other snares of living poor in Louisiana. 
Id. 
 49. See generally Gordon Bazemore & Jeanne B. Stinchcomb, Civic 
Engagement and Reintegration: Toward a Community-Focused Theory and 
Practice, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 241 (2004). 
 50. See generally Adrienne Lyles-Chockley, Transitions to Justice: 
Prisoner Reentry as an Opportunity to Confront and Counteract Racism, 6 
HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 259 (2009). 
 51. But see Ralph Richard Banks & Richard Thompson Ford, (How) Does 
Unconscious Bias Matter: Law, Politics, and Racial Inequality, 58 EMORY L.J. 
1053, 1068 (“The great contribution of the [Implicit Association Test] may be 
not that it captures a new type of bias, so much as that it employs a subtle and 
sophisticated means of measuring bias, which has become ever more elusive as 
research participants attempt to outsmart any test that would label them a 
racist.”); B. Keith Payne et al., Why Do Implicit and Explicit Attitude Tests 
Diverge? The Role of Structural Fit, 94 J. PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 
16–31 (2008) (“[M]easuring implicit responses is less like an archeological dig 
and more like fishing in a river. Implicit tests tap attitudes upstream, but explicit 
tests catch what flows downstream, muddied in the editing for public report.”). 
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misguided.52 However, to disregard or deny altogether the State’s 
responsibility for these stark racial realities would be equally 
unwise.  
II. NON-UNANIMOUS JURY VERDICTS 
Community participation in the administration of the criminal 
law . . . is not only consistent with our democratic heritage but is 
also critical to public confidence in the fairness of the criminal 
justice system.53 
Perhaps the most meaningful way in which a person can 
participate in the criminal justice system is to serve on a criminal 
jury. The right to a trial by jury was enshrined in our Constitution 
in large part to check governmental overreaching.54 Jurors––
interposed between the government and the individual defendant––
play the crucial role of determining whether the government has 
proved its charges, and whether punishment is warranted. In other 
words, a criminal juror possesses the solemn responsibility to 
render justice. Not only is jury participation a momentous way for 
minorities to participate in the administration of justice, but it is 
also one of the few roles readily and realistically available to 
them.55 
                                                                                                             
 52. See Pierce & Radelet, supra note 11, at 671 (“[R]acial bias . . . can very 
well be unintended and not recognized by the individual decision makers 
themselves.”). 
 53. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975). See also Peters v. Kiff, 
407 U.S. 493, 503 (1972) (“When any large and identifiable segment of the 
community is excluded from jury service, the effect is to remove from the jury 
room qualities of human nature and varieties of human experience, the range of 
which is unknown and perhaps unknowable.”); Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530–31 
(“[T]he broad representative character of the jury should be maintained, partly 
as assurance of a diffused impartiality and partly because sharing in the 
administration of justice is a phase of civic responsibility.” (alteration in 
original) (citation omitted)). 
 54. See THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 498 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton 
Rossiter ed., 1961) (“The friends and adversaries of the plan of the convention, 
if they agree in nothing else, concur at least in the value they set upon the trial 
by jury; or if there is any difference between them it consists in this: the former 
regard it as a valuable safeguard to liberty; the latter represent it as the very 
palladium of free government.”).  
 55. African Americans are severely under-represented as judges, district 
attorneys, and defense attorneys. ILLEGAL RACIAL DISCRIMINATION, supra note 
37, at 41–43 (examining the lack of African Americans in these decision-making 
roles in Southern states).  
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African Americans are vastly under-represented on criminal 
juries in Louisiana.56 The disproportionate removal of African-
American citizens is not an accidental feature of the criminal 
justice system. Instead, it is the intentional result of discriminatory 
historical mandates, compounded today by seemingly neutral 
policies and practices that exacerbate already racially disparate 
outcomes.57 To understand history’s influence, one must revisit the 
Colfax Massacre that took place on Easter Sunday in 1873.  
A. The Historical Backdrop 
Nearly five years had passed since the country ratified the 
Fourteenth Amendment, granting citizenship and its privileges to 
every person born in the United States. And, just over three years 
had passed since the country ratified the Fifteenth Amendment, 
providing black citizens with the right to vote. These Amendments 
were direct attempts to heal the black eye that the Dred Scott58 
decision inflicted on the nation. The gospel of racial enlightenment 
had yet to make its way to the city of Colfax in Grant Parish, 
Louisiana, however. As Justice Thomas described in his 
concurring opinion in McDonald v. Chicago, on that Easter 
Sunday in 1873, “members of a white militia . . .  brutally 
murdered as many as 165 black Louisianans congregating outside 
a courthouse . . . .”59 The story behind this tragedy, known as the 
“Colfax Massacre,” began with the Louisiana Governor’s race of 
1872 and continued with the practical demise of the 
Reconstruction Amendments in the South.60  
After the violence, federal officials ultimately arrested 97 militia 
members.61 Federal prosecutors secured indictments under freshly 
                                                                                                             
 56. See, e.g., ILLEGAL RACIAL DISCRIMINATION, supra note 37, at 5, 14, 23–
24; see generally Nijole Benokraitis, Racial Exclusion in Juries, 18 J. APPLIED 
BEHAV. SCI. 29 (1982).  
 57. See discussion infra Part II.A–D. 
 58. In Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857), the Court held that no 
person of African descent was a citizen under Article III. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 
407 (upholding the history by which people of African descent had “no rights 
which the white man was bound to respect . . . [they] might justly and lawfully 
be reduced to slavery for [their] benefit . . . and treated as an ordinary article of 
merchandise and traffic . . . .”). 
 59. McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S.Ct. 3020, 3060 (2010) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 
 60. For a comprehensive history, see CHARLES LANE, THE DAY FREEDOM 
DIED: THE COLFAX MASSACRE, THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE BETRAYAL OF 
RECONSTRUCTION (2008). 
 61. Sonja R. West, No Civilized System of Justice, 11 GREEN BAG 2d 521, 
526 (2008) (reviewing LANE, supra note 60) (noting that federal prosecutors 
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minted federal civil rights legislation aimed at enforcing the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.62 Nine militia members 
proceeded to trial, and juries returned guilty verdicts against three of 
them, including William Cruikshank, who, as Justice Alito noted in 
McDonald, “himself allegedly marched unarmed African-American 
prisoners through the streets and then had them summarily 
executed.”63 The defendants in the Colfax massacre were found 
guilty of conspiring to violate the privileges enjoyed by all citizens 
under the Fourteenth Amendment, including the privilege of 
associating together peaceably and the right to bear arms.64  
Cruikshank appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which granted 
certiorari to address whether the statute under which the 
convictions were secured violated the scope of federal power. The 
Court cited the ruling in the Slaughter-House Cases65 when it held 
in United States v. Cruikshank that the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause did not provide the federal government with the authority to 
prosecute state residents with violations of individual 
constitutional rights unless those rights emanated directly from the 
Constitution (rather than from a source that predated the 
Constitution and its Amendments).66 The upshot of the Slaughter-
House Cases and Cruikshank was to render the Reconstruction 
Amendments and Civil Rights legislation unenforceable.67  
Writing in United States v. Louisiana, then-United States 
District Court Judge Wisdom recounted the sordid history that 
followed the Colfax Massacre:  
In 1874 six white Republican officeholders of Red River 
Parish were killed, after they had surrendered and had 
agreed to leave the State. . . . Representative white citizens 
                                                                                                             
 
initially secured indictments against 97 militia members on 32 counts under the 
Enforcement Act).  
 62. Id. at 525. 
 63. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3030.  
 64. Id. 
 65. In the now infamous Slaughter-House Cases, the Court held that the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause contained in the Fourteenth Amendment did 
not constrain Louisiana from granting a monopoly to a single entity in Orleans 
and surrounding parishes to exercise the right to maintain slaughterhouses and 
cattle-yards to the exclusion of all other butchers and cattle-owners. Slaughter-
House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873). 
 66. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 554–55 (1876). 
 67. See, e.g., Eugene Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights 
Legislation, 50 MICH. L. REV. 1323, 1339–40 (1952); Wilson R. Huhn, The 
Legacy of Slaughterhouse, Bradwell, and Cruikshank in Constitutional 
Interpretation, 42 AKRON L. REV. 1051, 1079–80 (2009). 
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considered it a civic duty to belong first to The Knights of 
the White Camelia, a secret organization equivalent to the 
Ku Klux Klan in other states, and, later, to join the White 
League, a statewide organization which openly advocated 
white supremacy in a published platform. On September 
14, 1874, the Crescent City (New Orleans) White League, 
which was organized militarily, led by influential citizens, 
successfully fought a pitched battle in New Orleans against 
3000 of [Republican Governor] Kellogg’s Negro militia, 
1000 Metropolitan Police under General Longstreet, and 
several hundred federal troops. The White League took 
over complete control of the City, then the Capitol of 
Louisiana, and established in the Statehouse Acting 
[Democrat] Governor Penn and, later, [Democrat] 
Governor McEnery.68  
In the face of these erupting racial tensions, Northern political 
leaders abandoned their duty to protect black citizens. For 
example, in April 1877, President Rutherford Hayes, as part of the 
Hayes–Tilden compromise that landed him the Presidency after a 
hotly disputed election,69 removed federal troops from Louisiana 
and recognized the Democratic Administration as the legal 
government of the state.70 As Judge Wisdom wrote, these events 
foreshadowed subsequent infamous racial lowlights, such as “the 
lily white primary, [which] marked the emergence of the 
Democratic party in the south as the institutionalized incarnation of 
the will to White Supremacy . . . .”71  
B. The 1898 Constitutional Convention Implements the Non-
Unanimous Jury Verdict Policy 
After employing brute force to capture the Louisiana 
government in the 1870s, the Democrats used the 1898 
Constitutional Convention to steal suffrage from African-American 
citizens.72 As the Convention’s President, Ernest Benjamin 
Kruttschnitt revealed that the sinister purpose of the Convention 
                                                                                                             
 68. United States v. Louisiana, 225 F.Supp. 353, 366–68 (E.D. La. 1963) 
(footnotes omitted). 
 69. Theodore B. Olson, The Supreme Court & the Presidency, 9 GREEN 
BAG 2d 139, 145 (2006) (“The disputed election of 1876 had almost led to 
another civil war.”). 
 70. See, e.g., United States v. Louisiana, 225 F.Supp. at 368–69. 
 71. Id. at 368 (internal quotations omitted). 
 72. See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, The Canon(s) of Constitutional Law: 
Democracy, Anti-Democracy, and the Canon, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 295, 303 
(2000). 
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was to create a racial architecture in Louisiana that could 
circumvent the Reconstruction Amendments and marginalize the 
political power of black citizens.73 The Chairman of the 
Convention’s Judiciary Committee, Judge Thomas Semmes, held 
nothing back: “We [are] here to establish the supremacy of the 
white race, and the white race constitutes the Democratic party of 
this State.”74 Or, as Judge Wisdom wrote, “[t]he Convention of 
1898 interpreted its mandate from the [Louisiana] people to be, to 
disfranchise as many Negroes and as few whites as possible.”75  
The Delegates achieved these anti-participation goals not only 
by restricting access to the ballot box but also by diluting the voice 
of members of racial minority groups by allowing non-unanimous 
jury verdicts in criminal cases.76 The historical record from the 
Constitutional Convention demonstrates clearly that the delegates 
were preoccupied with disenfranchising African-American voters, 
but reflects little discussion on the non-unanimous jury policy.77 
However, contemporaneous accounts of how white supremacists in 
Louisiana responded to black jury participation during 
Reconstruction amply demonstrate what animated their decisions 
at the Convention.78 
The non-unanimous verdict policy enabled the state to prevent 
an African American from hijacking sentencing outcomes:  
He [the freed slave] does not appear to much advantage in 
any capacity in the courts of law . . . . As a juror, he will 
follow the lead of his white fellows in causes involving 
distinctive white interests; but if a negro be on trial for any 
crime, he becomes at once his earnest champion, and a 
hung jury is the usual result. At a recent trial in Limestone 
County, Texas, a colored juror refused to send a murderer 
to State Prison for life, because, as he said, it looked too 
                                                                                                             
 73. LOUISIANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION JOURNAL, supra note 5, at 
380. 
 74. Id. at 374. 
 75. United States v. Louisiana, 225 F. Supp. at 371 (internal quotations and 
citations omitted). 
 76. See LA. CONST. OF 1898, art. 116 (“[C]ases in which the punishment is 
necessarily at hard labor, [shall be tried] by a jury of twelve, nine of whom 
concurring may render a verdict . . . .”); LA. CONST. OF 1974, art. I, § 17 (“A 
case in which the punishment is necessarily confinement at hard labor shall be 
tried before a jury of twelve persons, ten of whom must concur to render a 
verdict.”); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 782 (2009) (“Cases in which punishment 
is necessarily confinement at hard labor shall be tried by a jury composed of 
twelve jurors, ten of whom must concur to render a verdict.”). 
 77. See supra notes 72–75. 
 78. See infra notes 79–81 and accompanying text. 
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much like putting the man into bondage; but readily 
consented to a verdict of 99 years’ imprisonment.79 
Moreover, black jurors were viewed as ignorant, incapable of 
determining credibility, and susceptible to bribery.80 One 
commentator went so far as to claim that criminals would simply 
not be convicted because of the African-American presence in the 
jury box.81 These overtly racist views captured the beliefs of the 
Convention’s delegates and set the backdrop for the Constitutional 
Convention, the non-unanimous jury verdict policy, and their 
ongoing effects today.  
C. Non-Unanimous Jury Verdicts Today 
Louisiana’s policy of non-unanimous jury verdicts continues to 
limit meaningful African-American participation today. For 
example, in 2009, the foreman of Corey Miller’s82 jury said the 
jurors had found him guilty of second-degree murder.83 When the 
judge polled the jurors individually, however, he found nine jurors 
voted for conviction, two for acquittal, and one for a conviction 
“under duress.”84 The final vote rendered the verdict invalid. The 
judge refused to declare a mistrial, and sent the jury back for 
further deliberation.85 Three hours later, and after 13 total hours of 
deliberation, the jury returned with a 10–2 guilty verdict, which 
meant Mr. Miller would be automatically sentenced to life without 
                                                                                                             
 79. Future of the Freedman, DAILY PICAYUNE, Aug. 31, 1873, at 5. 
 80. See The Present Jury System, DAILY PICAYUNE, Apr. 20, 1870, at 4; see 
also Female Suffrage, DAILY PICAYUNE, May 8, 1879, at 4 (arguing that women 
“should no longer be treated as aliens, as the State needs their votes now . . . to 
neutralize those of the vicious and ignorant, who have no financial or other 
interest in the community unless it be to rob the treasury”). 
 81. See The Present Jury System, THE DAILY PICAYUNE, Apr. 20, 1870, at 4 
(“[N]egroes . . . [are] capable only of being corrupted by bribes to espouse the 
side of criminals willing to pay for verdicts . . . . [A]s things go now, criminals 
have but slight fear of losing their life or liberty on indictments and jury trials.”).  
 82. Robert J. Smith, along with co-counsel Charles Ogletree, Ronald 
Sullivan and John Adcock, represents Mr. Miller on appeal. 
 83. This was the second time he faced trial on the same murder charge. The 
State failed to disclose exculpatory evidence at his first trial, and the Louisiana 
Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s decision to grant a new trial in light of 
the State’s misconduct. See State v. Miller, 923 So. 2d 625 (La. 2006).  
 84. See, e.g., C.J. Lin, Metairie Woman Says She Voted to Convict C-
Murder to End ‘Brutal’ Jury Deliberations, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Aug. 26, 2009 
[hereinafter Brutal Deliberations], available at: http://www.nola.com/crime/ 
index.ssf/2009/08/metairie_woman_says_she_vocted.html.  
 85. See id.; see also C.J. Lin, C-Murder Guilty of Second-Degree Murder 
After Topsy-Turvy Jury Action, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Aug. 11, 2009, available at: 
http://www.nola.com/news/index.ssf/2009/08/cmurder_verdict_1.html. 
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the possibility of parole.86 Two weeks later, Mary Jacobs, the juror 
who switched her vote to guilty, told the Times-Picayune that she 
did not believe the State proved its case beyond a reasonable 
doubt, but voted guilty nonetheless under “brutal” pressure from 
other jurors directed at the dissenting jurors, and at one young 
black juror in particular.87 Jacobs explained:  
They [the other jurors] literally made this 20-year-old girl 
so violently ill . . . She was shaking so bad. She ran into the 
bathroom. She was throwing her guts up. She couldn’t 
function anymore. That’s when I decided, the judge don’t 
want to listen to me, doesn’t want to listen to us? I told 
them, “You want him to be guilty? He’s guilty, now let’s 
get the hell out of here.”88  
The public reaction to the news centered less on the juror that 
changed her vote than the decision–rule itself. Forty-eight states 
and the federal system require criminal juries to render unanimous 
jury verdicts. Louisiana is one of only two jurisdictions in the 
country that allows less-than-unanimous verdicts in criminal 
cases.89 Somewhat surprisingly, the Times-Picayune published 
pieces about Mr. Miller’s case with titles including: “How [10–2] 
verdict policy hurts black defendants,”90 “10–2 jury close enough 
for Louisiana,”91 and “C-Murder guilty of second-degree murder 
after topsy-turvy jury action.”92 As the titles of those articles 
imply, there was a palpable racial component to the 10–2 rule in 
this case. Indeed, three black jurors served on Mr. Miller’s jury—
two voted to acquit him.93  
                                                                                                             
 86. See Lin, Topsy-Turvy Jury Action, supra note 85 (“At the defense’s 
request, the jury was polled and the vote was revealed to be 10–2 in favor of 
conviction. Ten of 12 votes are required for a second-degree murder 
conviction.”); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:30.1 (2009) (providing for mandatory 
life-without-parole sentence for second-degree murder). 
 87. See Lin, Brutal Deliberations, supra note 84.  
 88. Id. 
 89. See LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 782 (2009); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
136.450 (Westlaw 2011). 
 90. Annette Sisco, How Verdict Policy Hurts Black Defendants, TIMES-
PICAYUNE, Aug. 27, 2009, available at http://blog.nola.com/jamesgill/2009/08/ 
how_verdict_policy_hurts_black.html. 
 91. Annette Sisco, 10-2 Jury Close Enough for Louisiana, TIMES-
PICAYUNE, Aug. 15, 2009, available at http://blog.nola.com/jamesgill/2009/ 
08/102_jury_close_enough_for_loui.html. 
 92. See Lin, Topsy-Turvy Jury Action, supra note 85. 
 93. See Sisco, supra note 90 (“Two of the three black jurors in the Miller 
case held out for acquittal.”). 
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D. The Detrimental Impact that Non-Unanimous Jury Verdicts 
Have on Justice and Meaningful Participation  
In Apodaca v. Oregon,94 the United States Supreme Court 
upheld the practice of non-unanimous jury verdicts in non-capital 
cases. The Apodaca plurality largely based its decision on the 
belief that the decision rule had no practical effect on jury 
deliberations.95 The Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to 
a jury trial requires only that the defendant have “the judgment of 
his peers interposed between himself and the officers of the State 
who prosecute and judge him” and that such an interest is “equally 
well served” by non-unanimous juries.96 Similarly, in Apodaca’s 
companion case, Johnson v. Louisiana, the Court held that 9-3 jury 
verdicts do not violate the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and expressed “our view that the fact of three 
dissenting votes to acquit raises no question of constitutional 
substance about either the integrity or the accuracy of the majority 
verdict of guilt.”97 
The dissenters disagreed, arguing that allowing non-unanimous 
juries “eliminates the circumstances in which a minority of jurors 
(a) could have rationally persuaded the entire jury to acquit, or (b) 
while unable to persuade the majority to acquit, nonetheless could 
have convinced them to convict only on a lesser-included 
offense.”98 The dissent also criticized the majority’s speculation 
that non-unanimous jury verdicts produced the same quality of 
deliberations as unanimous verdicts, noting how “human 
experience teaches that polite and academic conversation is no 
substitute for the earnest and robust argument necessary to reach 
unanimity.”99 The dissenters expressed fear that the first arguments 
to be ignored would be those expressed by members of identifiable 
minority groups.100 
Social science research produced since Apodaca and Johnson 
bolsters the view of the dissenters. Decision rules have an impact 
on both the quality and outcome of the deliberation: unanimous 
                                                                                                             
 94. 406 U.S. 404 (1972). 
 95. Id. at 411 (“[W]e perceive no difference between juries required to act 
unanimously and those permitted to convict or acquit by votes of 10 to two or 11 
to one.”); id. at 410 (finding that a unanimity requirement “does not materially 
contribute to the exercise of this common sense judgment”). 
 96. See id. at 411. 
 97. See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 360 (1972) (plurality opinion). 
 98. Id. at 388 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 99. See id. at 389 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 100. See id. at 399 (Stewart, J., dissenting); id. at 402 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting). 
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juries deliberate longer,101 discuss and debate the evidence more 
thoroughly,102 reach more reliable conclusions (as measured by the 
percent of votes consistent with the judge’s view of the 
evidence),103 and are more tolerant and respectful of dissenting 
voices.104 Jurors who participated in trials where a unanimous 
verdict was required report being more satisfied with their 
experience than jurors who operated under a non-unanimity rule.105 
There is also evidence that the non-unanimous decision rule 
operates to silence the view of minority group members.106 
In Empty Votes in Jury Deliberations, Professor Kim Taylor-
Thompson explained that the views of minority group members 
often are excluded from serious consideration when they are in the 
minority (number) of jurors.107 She writes,  
[b]ecause our system of justice charges the jury with 
evaluating the conduct of the accused, the jury can benefit 
from the observations and comments of individuals who 
share at least one socializing characteristic or who may 
have had some common experiences with the accused. 
These jurors can offer narratives to guide the jury’s 
understanding—or perhaps rejection—of the accused’s 
interpretation of events.108 
Housing patterns in many cities consist of neighborhoods with 
a high concentration of minority group members.109 These 
                                                                                                             
 101. See REID HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY 60 tbl. 4.1 (1983). 
 102. See Kim Taylor-Thompson, Empty Votes in Jury Deliberations, 113 
HARV. L. REV. 1261, 1272–73 (2000); AM. JURY PROJECT, AM. BAR ASS’N, 
PRINCIPLES FOR JURIES AND JURY TRIALS 24, available at http://www.american 
bar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/american_jury/final_commentary
_july_1205.authcheckdam.pdf.  
 103. See Dennis J. Devine et al., Jury Decision Making: 45 Years of 
Empirical Research on Deliberations, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 622, 669 
(2001).  
 104. See, e.g., Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Revisiting the Unanimity 
Requirement: The Behavior of the Non-Unanimous Civil Jury, 100 NW. U. L. 
REV. 201, 230 (2006). 
 105. See Michael J. Saks, What Do Jury Experiments Tell Us About How 
Juries (Should) Make Decisions?, 6 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 41 (1997). 
 106. See, e.g., Hon. Janet Bond Arterton, Unconscious Bias and the 
Impartial Jury, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1023, 1028–29 (2008); PRINCIPLES FOR 
JURIES AND JURY TRIALS, supra note 102, at 24. 
 107. See Taylor-Thompson, supra note 102. 
 108. Id. at 1279. 
 109. See generally Leland Ware, Race and Urban Space: Hypersegregated 
Housing Patterns and the Failure of School Desegregation, 9 WIDENER L. 
SYMP. J. 55 (2002); William H. Carter et al., Polarisation, Public Housing, and 
Racial Minorities in US Cities, 35 URBAN STUDIES 1889 (1998). 
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neighborhoods often also suffer from concentrated poverty and 
violence.110 So the perspective that is missing in cases where 
defendants or victims are minority group members is not only that 
which comes from sharing a culture or group identity but often the 
one that comes from living in areas where crime is a fact of life. 
Richard Wright’s Native Son captures an extreme form of this 
dynamic.111 A wealthy white woman from Chicago tells the 
protagonist, a poor, black man named Bigger Thomas that, though 
she has traveled around the world, she has no knowledge of how 
people live in the poorer, blacker neighborhoods of the city just 
blocks from where she grew up. Wright says that Bigger Thomas 
knew then that he could never explain to a white person of 
privilege why he committed murder because “the telling of it 
would have involved the explanation of his entire life.”112  
One practical example of where this difference in perspective 
could arise is in the believability of testimony that a police officer 
planted evidence. Following the O.J. Simpson trial, 78% of black 
respondents believed the jury reached the correct verdict, while 
fewer than 50% of white respondents thought so.113 Post-O.J. trial 
polling also revealed that nearly three of four black respondents as 
compared to one in four white respondents believed the criminal 
justice system is biased.114 
These divergent perspectives on law enforcement have deep 
roots. A study conducted by Professor Jen Crocker found that 84% 
of black participants (but just 4% of white participants) agreed that 
it “might possibly be true” or “definitely [is] true” that “the 
government deliberately makes sure that drugs are available in 
                                                                                                             
 110. See e.g., DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN 
APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 125–42 
(1993); WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER 
CITY, THE UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 20–108 (1987). 
 111. RICHARD WRIGHT, NATIVE SON (1940). 
 112. Id. at 356. 
 113. Darnell M. Hunt, (Re)Affirming Race: “Reality,” Negotiation, and the 
“Trial of the Century”, 38 SOC. Q. 399, 400 (1997); see also Richard Morin, 
Poll Reflects Division Over Simpson Case: Trial Damaged Image of Courts, 
Races Agree, WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 1995, at A31 (citing poll that found 55% of 
white Americans thought Simpson was guilty and 85% of African Americans 
thought he was innocent); Leland Ware, Essays on Race Reach Beyond the 
Superficial, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 18, 1996, at 5D (“[T]he reaction to 
the verdict proves, beyond any doubt, that white and black Americans view the 
same events from vastly different perspectives”). 
 114. Russell Robinson, Perceptual Segregation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 
1100 (2008) (citing CBS News/New York Times O.J. Simpson Poll #2, July 
1994) (“In 1994, a CBS News/New York Times poll found that roughly 40% of 
blacks, compared to 15% of whites, believed that the criminal justice system 
was biased against Simpson.”). 
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poor Black neighborhoods.”115 Interpreting Crocker’s results, 
Professor Russell Robinson suggests that differing levels of 
historical understanding could account for the disparity.116  
Another set of concerns goes to the core of reliable trial 
verdicts. The viewpoint of racial minorities who are in the minority 
position on a criminal jury is particularly important in instances 
where eyewitness identification is the primary type of evidence. 
Evidence that cross-racial identifications are more error-prone than 
same-race identifications is overwhelming,117 and more recent 
evidence suggests that the phenomenon can be traced to the 
neurological level.118 As Professor Sheri Lynn Johnson explains: 
[F]or most people, when they are observing faces, there is 
greater activity in the fusiform region of the brain (which is 
the region in which face recognition takes place) when a 
person tries to recognize a person of the same race as when 
he or she tries to recognize a person of another race. This 
probably explains much of why cross-racial identifications 
are less reliable; the brain just isn’t working as hard.119  
Minority group members may be particularly adept at 
distinguishing between, for example, the description of an intruder 
                                                                                                             
 115. Id. At 1110 (citing Jennifer Crocker et al., Belief in U.S. Government 
Conspiracies Against Blacks Among Black and White College Students: 
Powerlessness or System Blame?, 25 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 
941, 946 app. A (1999)). 
 116. See id. at 1111 (“One possible explanation for these disparities, which 
the authors recognized, was differential knowledge of historical instances of 
racial discrimination . . . .”). 
 117. See, e.g., Sandra Guerra Thompson, Beyond a Reasonable Doubt? 
Reconsidering Uncorroborated Eyewitness Identification Testimony, 41 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1487, 1493 (“The phenomenon of unreliable cross-racial 
identifications is universally accepted as fact by psychologists.”). 
 118. Professor Matthew Lieberman and colleagues conducted an experiment 
using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) technology to measure the 
level of amygdala activity of participants after seeing a black versus a white 
face. The amygdala is a region of the brain that mediates emotional responses, 
including perceived threats. Lieberman found that amygdala activity in both 
white and black participants increased when shown a black face versus a white 
face. The authors concluded that the most plausible explanation for this 
universal increase in amygdala activity is due to the activation of “culturally 
learned negative associations regarding African-Americans.” Matthew D 
Lieberman et al., An fMRI Investigation of Race-related Amygdala Activity in 
African-American and Caucasian-American Individuals, 8 NATURE 
NEUROSCIENCE 720, 722 (2005), available at http://www.scn.ucla.edu/pdf/ 
nature%20neuroscience%20press/nn1465.pdf (last visited October 19, 2011). 
 119. Sheri Lynn Johnson, Litigating for Racial Fairness After McCleskey v. 
Kemp, 39 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 178, 193–94 (2007). 
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or attacker made to the police and a black defendant who has 
similar Afrocentric features but is not the offender.  
It is also plausible that minority group members would be 
better able to contextualize and evaluate culturally specific 
language or actions. Two studies from the implicit social cognition 
literature suggest that the race of the defendant affects the way 
jurors remember events and interpret ambiguous evidence. 
Professor Justin Levinson conducted an elegant experiment to test 
whether implicit race bias impacted jurors’ memories of case 
facts.120 Levinson provided jury-eligible participants with a 
fictional story about a confrontation between two men. Some 
jurors read about “William” the white defendant, while others read 
about “Tyrone” the black defendant. The rest of the story remained 
constant. But, when Levinson asked jurors to remember pertinent 
facts from “the confrontation,” he found that the race of the 
defendant impacted how participants recalled the story’s details. 
Participants more frequently remembered aggressive details when 
Tyrone, rather than William, was the defendant. Levinson 
concluded “that the race of a civil plaintiff or a criminal defendant 
can act implicitly to cause people to misremember a case’s facts in 
racially biased ways.”121 The participants appeared to remember 
“facts” that did not appear in the story more often when those facts 
were stereotype-consistent, such as facts that portray black males 
as aggressive.122 
In another study, Professor Levinson and Danielle Young 
tested whether implicit race bias impacts jurors’ interpretation of 
                                                                                                             
 120. Justin Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decision 
Making, and Misremembering, 57 DUKE L.J. 345 (2007). On the strength and 
scope of implicit bias generally, see Jerry Kang and Mahzarin Banaji, Fair 
Measures: a Behavioral Realist Revision of “Affirmative Action”, 94 CAL. L. 
REV. 1063 (2006) (“Seventy-five percent of Whites (and fifty percent of Blacks) 
show anti-Black bias . . . . These results contrast sharply with the views 
expressed on explicit surveys. These data, as well as the findings in dozens of 
experiments that meet the criteria of replicability and peer-review, demonstrate 
that we are not color or gender blind, and perhaps that we cannot be.”); id. at 
1072 (“As disturbing as this evidence [of implicit bias] is, there is too much of it 
to be ignored. Moreover, recent discoveries regarding malleability of bias 
provide the basis to imagine both individual and institutional change.”). The two 
paragraphs discussing Justin Levinson’s studies were originally published in 
footnotes in Ben Cohen & Robert J. Smith, The Racial Geography of the 
Federal Death Penalty, 85 WASH. L. REV. 425, n. 243 (2010). 
 121. Levinson, supra note 120 at 350. 
 122. Id.; see also Justin Levinson, Race, Death, and the Complicitous Mind, 
58 DEPAUL L. REV. 599, 614–15 (2009). 
2012] RACE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN LOUISIANA 383 
 
 
 
ambiguous evidence.123 They provided a group of jury-eligible 
participants with a brief background story of a fictional Mini Mart 
robbery and then had the participants view three pictures from the 
crime scene for four seconds each.124 The first and second pictures 
were innocuous. The third picture––the centerpiece of the study––
displayed one masked assailant reaching over the counter with a 
gun in his left hand. The only identifiable race-cue for the assailant 
is a small section of visible flesh on his forearm. Levinson altered 
the skin-tone of the assailant, showing half the participants a light-
skinned suspect and the other half a dark-skinned suspect. After 
watching the short video, suspects were told that a suspect was 
caught, and then provided with a series of ambiguous evidence 
about the suspect.125 Levinson asked the participants to rate the 
probative value of each piece of ambiguous evidence. 
The study produced several results. First, participants shown 
the photo of the dark-skinned suspect were significantly more 
likely to find ambiguous evidence more probative of guilt.126 
Participants who viewed the dark-skinned defendant were also 
more likely to believe that the suspect was guilty, both on a scale 
of 1-100 and by a traditional guilty / not guilty measure.127 As the 
authors concluded, these results undermine the foundational 
assumption that guilt is weighed solely based on the probative 
strength of the evidence.128  
                                                                                                             
 123. Justin D. Levinson & Danielle Young, Different Shades of Bias: Skin 
Tone, Implicit Racial Bias, and Judgments of Ambiguous Evidence, 112 W. VA. 
L. REV. 307 (2010).  
 124. This is the background story:  
The defendant has been charged with armed robbery. The incident 
occurred at 11pm on December 18, 2008, when the Quick Stop Mini 
Mart was robbed by two armed men wearing masks. According to the 
police report, the owner of the Mini Mart had just closed the store when 
two armed men barged into the store. One of the men pointed the gun at 
the owner while the other walked behind the counter to the cash 
register. The owner obeyed all of the men’s commands and was not 
injured. The men left the store with approximately $550 in cash. They 
fled in a dark blue 4-door full sized sedan. 
Id. at 331–32. 
 125. For example, (1) the defendant used to be addicted to drugs; (2) the 
defendant has been served with a notice of eviction from his apartment; (3) the 
defendant is left-handed; (4) the defendant was a youth Golden Gloves boxing 
champion in 2006; (4) the defendant is a member of an anti-violence 
organization; (5) the defendant does not have a driver’s license or car. Id. at 
332–33. 
 126. Id. at 337. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 339. 
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When life experiences cause viewpoints to differ on critical 
issues that arise during a trial,129 a non-unanimous decision rule 
allows the majority to bypass meaningful consideration of a 
perspective that might be difficult to swallow (and thus take time to 
explain and understand), based on their respective life 
experiences.130 As the Louisiana Supreme Court explained in State 
v. Collier, “[b]ecause only ten votes were needed to convict 
defendant . . . the prosecutor could have assumed, contrary to 
Batson’s admonition that it was unacceptable to do so, that all black 
jurors would vote on the basis of racial bias and then purposefully 
discriminated by limiting the number of blacks on the jury to 
two.”131 U.S. Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart put it more 
                                                                                                             
 129. The Supreme Court, in Turner v. Murray, put the point as follows: 
A juror who believes that blacks are violence prone or morally inferior 
might well be influenced by that belief in deciding whether the 
petitioner’s crime involved the aggravating factors specified under 
Virginia law. Such a juror might be less favorably inclined toward . . . 
mitigating [evidence]. . . . Fear of blacks, which could easily be stirred 
up by the violent facts of petitioner’s crime, might incline a juror to 
favor the death penalty. 
476 U.S. 28, 35 (1986); see also R. Richard Banks, Jennifer L. Eberhardt, & Lee 
Ross, Discrimination and Implicit Bias in a Racially Unequal Society, 94 CALIF. 
L. REV. 1169, 1172 (2006) (“Psychologists have documented and explored the 
longstanding stereotype of African Americans as violent and prone to 
criminality. Indeed, this is the stereotype most commonly applied to Blacks— or 
at least to young Black males.”). 
 130. See Robinson, supra note 114, at 1093 (“While many whites expect 
evidence of discrimination to be explicit, and assume that people are colorblind 
when such evidence is lacking, many blacks perceive bias to be prevalent and 
primarily implicit.”); id. (“[O]utsiders and insiders tend to perceive allegations of 
discrimination through fundamentally different psychological frameworks. A 
workplace may be spatially integrated and yet employees who work side by side 
may perceive an allegation of discrimination through very different lenses because 
of their disparate racial and gender identities.”); id. at 1120 (“[R]acialized pools 
[of information] are evident at many levels, including the family, media sources, 
and the workplace. Stories of perceived discrimination are often told in all-black 
settings, sometimes as a means of group therapy, sometimes as a means of 
entertainment, and sometimes as a little bit of both.”). 
 131. 553 So. 2d 815, 819–20 (La. 1989); see also State v. Cheatteam, 986 So. 
2d 738, 745 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2008) (“[The defense] pointed out that it appeared 
the prosecutor was attempting to ensure that only two African-Americans would 
serve on the jury. And in order to convict, the prosecutor needed only 10 
votes.”); but see State v. Tart, 672 So. 2d 116, 141 (La. 1996) (“In Collier . . . 
the presence of two African-Americans on the defendant’s jury did not 
necessarily defeat an inference of discrimination because the verdict only 
required a 10-2 vote. By contrast, in this capital case, the jury’s finding had to be 
unanimous.”). 
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directly: “Nine jurors can simply ignore the views of their fellow 
panel members of a different race or class.”132  
When delegates at the 1898 Constitutional Convention 
assembled the legal architecture to restrict the participation of 
black citizens in government, in part by allowing non-unanimous 
jury verdicts in criminal cases, the simple explanation was the 
belief that black people were inferior to white people and their 
participation in government risked degrading the quality of civic 
life.133 Today, Louisiana law still allows non-unanimous jury 
verdicts in all but death penalty cases. The justifications for the 
rule offered today, to the extent that they are offered at all, are not 
race-salient, but instead focus on perceived efficiency advantages 
(e.g. avoiding deadlock) and the fear of the runaway juror who will 
vote to acquit against the evidence. In reality though, the law still 
operates to discount the jury service of ordinary black citizens 
who, based on divergent experience and an apparent inherent 
neurological ability to more accurately identify members of their 
own race, may, on the margins, arrive at a different interpretation 
of the evidence than would the average white juror.134 In other 
words, if you eliminate intent and focus solely on impact, non-
unanimous juries today serve the same purpose that white 
supremacists intended them to serve when they designed the 
system more than a century ago.135  
III. PEREMPTORY STRIKES 
Lawyers can remove prospective jurors from the jury pool 
through either a cause or a peremptory challenge.136 Both parties 
possess an unlimited number of cause challenges because no 
biased juror should participate in the trial. Whereas cause 
                                                                                                             
 132. Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 397 (Stewart, J., dissenting) 
(referring to a 9-3 decision rule). 
 133. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 73–82. 
 134. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 344 (1987) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (“Warren McCleskey’s evidence confronts us with the subtle and 
persistent influence of the past. His message is a disturbing one to a society that 
has formally repudiated racism, and a frustrating one to a Nation accustomed to 
regarding its destiny as the product of its own will. Nonetheless, we ignore him 
at our peril, for we remain imprisoned by the past as long as we deny its 
influence in the present.”). 
 135. See Banks & Ford, supra note 51, at 1055 (“Racial injustice inheres in 
the entrenched substantive racial inequalities that pervade our society. These 
disparities are not primarily a consequence of contemporary racial bias.”). 
 136. See Carol A. Chase & Colleen P. Graffy, A Challenge for Cause Against 
Peremptory Challenges in Criminal Proceedings, 19 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. 
L.J. 507, 507 (1997). 
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challenges must be justified and explained,137 lawyers can use 
peremptory strikes to exclude anyone they wish for almost any 
reason, and they need not explain the basis for these strikes.138 
However, under the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection 
Clause, a party’s peremptory strike against a prospective juror 
cannot be motivated by race or gender.139  
A. The Historical Backdrop 
Although the non-unanimous jury verdict policy has apparently 
racialized historical foundations, the common-law rule providing 
the parties with peremptory strikes appears to pre-date the 
founding of this country (and its race-related quandaries). In 
England, individuals charged with a crime possessed 35 
peremptory strikes, and the Crown had none.140 The availability of 
these strikes did not apparently emerge out of a concern with racial 
minorities “degrading” politics; instead, they arose to display 
“tenderness and humanity to prisoners. . . .”141  
In the United States, peremptory challenges were based on the 
“common law” tradition established in England.142 As early as 
1790, Congress passed laws providing for peremptory strikes in 
criminal trials, and the States followed suit.143 Even though 
peremptory challenges were not necessarily predestined to racially 
discriminate, it is clear that “peremptory challenges constitute a 
jury selection practice that permits ‘those to discriminate who are 
of a mind to discriminate.’”144 
B. Peremptory Strikes in Practice Today 
Abundant empirical evidence indicates that peremptory strikes 
disproportionately exclude African Americans in criminal trials in 
Louisiana. Tulane University Sociology Professor Joel Devine 
                                                                                                             
 137. See id. at 507–08.  
 138. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965) (“The essential nature 
of the peremptory challenge is that it is one exercised without a reason stated, 
without inquiry and without being subject to the court’s control.”). 
 139. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1976) (prohibiting strikes on the 
basis of race); J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (prohibiting strikes on 
the basis of gender). 
 140. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF 
ENGLAND *347 (1769). 
 141. Id. at *346. 
 142. Swain, 380 U.S. at 212–16. 
 143. See id. at 214–16. 
 144. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96 (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 
(1953)). 
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worked with the Louisiana Capital Assistance Center145 to analyze 
the juror-strike patterns of Jefferson Parish Prosecutors across 
some 390 trials (involving over 12,000 jurors). The results, 
published in a study titled “Blackstrikes,” document a highly 
significant statistical correlation between a juror’s race and the 
State’s use of peremptory challenges.146 The study revealed that 
Jefferson Parish prosecutors struck qualified African-American 
prospective jurors at over three times the rate as qualified white 
prospective jurors.147  
Prosecutors in other parishes also exclude African Americans 
from criminal juries at an alarming rate. In St. Tammany Parish, 
the strike rate against African Americans appears comparable to 
that uncovered in Jefferson Parish. “In a review of first-degree and 
second-degree murder cases from a recent fifteen-year span, 
defense attorneys found that the prosecutors in that jurisdiction had 
peremptorily struck 68% of qualified African-American jurors 
compared to 19% of qualified white jurors.”148 And, “the records 
from two recent death-penalty cases in Caddo Parish show that the 
trend may also occur there: the State struck 73% (11 of 15) of 
qualified African-Americans from those two jury pools.”149 
Although research from other parishes is desirable, the trend is 
reflected across the South generally,150 and it reflects serious anti-
participation effects to the prosecutors’ use of peremptory 
challenges. 
 
 
                                                                                                             
 145. The Louisiana Capital Assistance Center was formerly named the 
Louisiana Crisis Assistance Center. See About the Louisiana Capital Assistance 
Center, THEJUSTICECENTER.ORG, http://www.thejusticecenter.org/lcac. 
 146. RICHARD BOURKE, JOE HINGSTON & JOEL DEVINE, LA. CRISIS 
ASSISTANCE CTR., BLACK STRIKES: A STUDY OF THE RACIALLY DISPARATE USE 
OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES BY THE JEFFERSON PARISH DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S 
OFFICE (2003), available at http://www.blackstrikes.com/resources/report/ 
black_strikes_report_september_2003.doc. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Bidish Sarma, An Enduring (and Disturbing) Legacy: Race-Neutrality, 
Judicial Apathy, and the Civic Exclusion of African-Americans in Louisiana, 1 
HLRE 49, 56 n.30 (citing Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 214, Hoffman v. 
Cain, Civil Action No. 2007-1913 (La. 12/12/08)). 
 149. Id. (citing State v. Coleman, 970 So. 2d 511, 513 (La. 2007) (“[T]he 
defendant based his Batson challenge on the fact that the prosecution used six of 
its eight peremptory challenges to strike African-American prospective jurors.”), 
and Brief of Petitioner-Appellant on Appeal at 39, State v. Dorsey, No. 2010-
KA-0216 (La. 2010), 2010 WL 6775737 (“[F]ive of the seven African-
Americans available were struck by the State.”)). 
 150. See generally ILLEGAL RACIAL DISCRIMINATION, supra note 37. 
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C. The Lack of Meaningful Judicial Enforcement 
Under the Supreme Court’s decision in Batson v. Kentucky, 
trial courts engage in a three-step analysis when a party alleges that 
the other side has discriminated against prospective jurors on the 
basis of race.151 At step one, the court must decide if the party 
alleging discrimination has made a prima facie case. The burden to 
establish a prima facie case is a light one.152 If the trial court finds 
that a prima facie case exists, at step two the party striking jurors 
must provide race-neutral reasons for the strike.153 Even if the 
reasons are ridiculous, they will pass muster at step two so long as 
they are neutral.154 Finally, if race-neutral reasons are provided, the 
trial court must determine at step three whether the reasons are 
credible and whether the party alleging discrimination has carried 
its burden of persuasion.155 The Batson framework should provide 
litigants in Louisiana sufficient Fourteenth Amendment protection, 
but it does not. 
Take, for example, the Louisiana Supreme Court’s treatment of 
the Black Strikes study. Although the U.S. Supreme Court has held 
that statistical and historical evidence is highly relevant,156 the 
Louisiana Supreme Court has dismissed such damning evidence of 
discrimination in jury selection.157 It has effectively cabined the 
significance of this evidence to the trial court’s step-one 
determination of a prima facie case, and precluded it from 
informing the final inquiry of discriminatory intent. Relying only 
on the race-neutrality of a prosecutor’s explanations given at step 
two, the Louisiana Supreme Court functionally terminates the 
process and forecloses the relevance of statistical and historical 
                                                                                                             
 151. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96–98 (1976). 
 152. See Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 169–70 (2005). 
 153. See Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767 (1995) (per curiam). 
 154. Id. at 767–68 (“The second step of [Batson] does not demand an 
explanation that is persuasive, or even plausible. . . . ‘Unless a discriminatory 
intent is inherent in the prosecutor’s explanation, the reason offered will be 
deemed race-neutral.’”) (quoting Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360 
(plurality opinion)).  
 155. Id. at 767. 
 156. See, e.g., Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 342 (2003) [hereinafter 
Miller-El I] (“[T]he statistical evidence alone raises some debate as to whether 
the prosecution acted with a race-based reason when striking prospective 
jurors.”). 
 157. See, e.g., Unpublished Appendix at *10, State v. Dressner, 45 So. 3d 
127 (La. 2010) (No. 08-KA-1366) (on file with authors) (setting aside statistics 
and history altogether because “a review of the voir dire record as a whole 
indicates the State articulated race and gender-neutral reasons for each of the 
eight challenges about which defendant now complains”).  
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evidence.158 It rubber-stamps the State’s step-two reasons in the 
step-three analysis, and denies the criminal defendant’s claim.159 
Contrary to the Louisiana Supreme Court’s approach, however, 
statistics and history are meant to inform the ultimate question 
concerning the prosecutor’s intent and credibility.160 Instead, in 
Louisiana, a simple race-neutral explanation—even a fantastic or 
demonstrably false one—overwhelms the significance of this 
evidence.161  
For all practical purposes, the Louisiana Supreme Court has 
refused to consider a defendant’s claims of discrimination against 
African-American jurors except in extraordinary cases where the 
prosecutor’s racial bias is downright obvious. For example, in 
State v. Coleman, the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed where the 
State’s reason for striking a black juror was simply not race-
neutral.162 There, the prosecutor explained that it struck a 
prospective juror who served as a “captain with the fire department 
in Bossier City, [because he] filed a lawsuit against the city 
alleging institutional discrimination. . . . There is a black defendant 
in this case. There are white victims.”163 Similarly, in State v. 
Harris, a capital case from Jefferson Parish, the Louisiana 
                                                                                                             
 158. Id.; see also State v. Jacobs, 32 So. 3d 227, 236–33 (La. 2010) (rejecting 
the power of statistical evidence that “the state used 87% of its peremptory 
strikes to challenge non-white prospective jurors, in a venire where non-white 
prospective jurors comprised less than 19% of the prospective jurors” by 
looking at the merits of every individual Batson challenge). 
 159. Over twenty years ago, Justice Lemmon warned that such an approach 
would devastate Batson. See State v. Collier, 553 So. 2d 815, 821 (La. 1989) 
(“‘Rubber stamp’ approval of any non-racial explanation, no matter how 
whimsical or fanciful, would destroy Batson’s objective to ensure that no citizen 
is disqualified from jury service because of his race.”). 
 160. See Miller-El I, 537 U.S. at 342 (noting that statistical evidence could 
uphold an ultimate finding of discrimination); Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 
240–41 (2005) [hereinafter Miller-El II] (considering statistical evidence and 
comparative juror analysis in its step-three discussion); McCleskey v. Kemp, 
481 U.S. 279, 293 (noting that the Supreme Court “has accepted statistical 
disparities as proof of an equal protection violation in the selection of the jury 
venire in a particular district”). 
 161. In the Dressner opinion, the Louisiana Supreme Court asserted that the 
Jefferson Parish prosecutors’ ability to give race-neutral reasons indicated that 
they had “a clear intent . . . to distance themselves from the errors of their office 
in the past.” Unpublished Appendix at *35, State v. Dressner, 45 So. 3d 127 (La. 
2010) (No. 08-KA-1366) (on file with authors). But, even the court’s opinion 
acknowledged that when confronted with the historical and statistical evidence 
gathered in the Black Strikes study, the prosecutor said, it was a “‘sham of a 
study by the Louisiana Crisis Assistance Center’ included here to ‘keep it in the 
forefront.’” Id. at *34. 
 162. State v. Coleman, 970 So. 2d 511 (La. 2007). 
 163. Id. at 514. 
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Supreme Court reversed where the prosecutor provided as a reason 
to justify a peremptory strike of an African-American juror that he 
was “the only single black male on the panel with no children.”164 
Beyond these remarkable cases, the Louisiana Supreme Court has 
refused to issue ultimate findings of discrimination. Indeed, in the 
case of Allen Snyder, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the 
Louisiana Supreme Court because it failed to identify race 
discrimination in jury selection even though the prosecutor’s 
explanation for striking an African American was implausible.165 
The Louisiana high court’s begrudging approach166 insulates much 
discrimination from meaningful scrutiny because cases in which 
prosecutors spill the beans by supplying a non-race-neutral 
explanation are few and far between.167  
The Louisiana Supreme Court has not only resisted finding 
discrimination, but it has also actively reversed lower courts that 
have tried to remedy racial bias. After the second trial of Lawrence 
Jacobs, the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal reversed the 
conviction.168 After a thoughtful review of the precedent and the 
voluminous record, the court found that the prosecution’s stated 
reasons for striking two African-American jurors were 
“implausible” and unsupported by the record.169 The Louisiana 
Supreme Court took the case as part of its discretionary docket, 
reversed the intermediate court, and reinstated the conviction.170 
The message to lower courts that they should not overturn criminal 
convictions or undermine prosecutors’ explanations was clear. In 
fact, the Fifth Circuit recently heeded the message and denied the 
                                                                                                             
 164. State v. Harris, 820 So. 2d 471, 474 (La. 2002). 
 165. See Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472 (2008). 
 166. In Snyder, the Louisiana Supreme Court’s approach replicated the trial 
court’s approach. According to the trial court, the prosecutor’s comparison of 
Allen Snyder (an African-American defendant) to O.J. Simpson was not racially 
significant because the prosecutor had not mentioned the race of the defendant 
or the race of O.J. Simpson. State v. Snyder, 750 So. 2d 832, 846 (La. 1999). At 
oral argument at the U.S. Supreme Court, Justice Souter asked, “Now that is not 
a critical mind at work, is it?” Oral Argument at 36, Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 
U.S. 472 (2007) (No. 06-10119) available at a http://www.supremecourt.gov/ 
oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/06-10119.pdf.  
 167. See Sheri L. Johnson, The Language and Culture (Not to Say Race) of 
Peremptory Challenges, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 21, 59 (1993) (“If prosecutors 
exist who . . . cannot create a ‘racially neutral’ reason for discriminating on the 
basis of race, bar examinations are too easy.”). 
 168. State v. Jacobs, 13 So. 3d 677 (La. Ct. App. 5th 2009), rev’d per 
curiam, 32 So. 3d 227 (La. 2010). 
 169. Id. at 691–92 (La. Ct. App. 5th 2009). 
 170. State v. Jacobs, 32 So. 3d 227, 234 (la. 2010) (per curiam). 
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numerous Batson issues that lingered after the Louisiana Supreme 
Court’s remand and reprimand.171 
D. Strikes Justified by Disparate Questioning and Racially 
Disparate Responses Attributable to State Action  
Prosecutors are able to reduce the number of African American 
citizens who sit on juries by use of ever more sophisticated 
questions. For example, in State v. Miller, the prosecution asked 
the jurors to rate their feelings of the Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s 
Office on a scale of 1-10. The State struck four prospective black 
jurors, but no prospective white jurors, based on the differing 
responses to this question.172 This question is race-neutral on its 
face, but, as prosecutors know, distrust of the police is more 
prominent among black citizens than white citizens.173 Part of the 
discrepancy stems from first-hand encounters with law 
enforcement that the black citizen interpreted to be racist, either 
explicitly (e.g., use of terms with racial meaning, such as “nigger” 
or “boy”) or vicariously (e.g., being stopped for “driving while 
black”).174 Second-hand stories also account for some of the 
attitude differential between white and black citizens, as an 
African-American “victim [of discriminatory policing] frequently 
shares the account with family and friends in order to lighten the 
                                                                                                             
 171. See State v. Jacobs, 67 So. 3d 535 (La. Ct. App. 5th 2011) (rejecting 
remaining Batson claims on direct appeal).  
 172. See Record at 2578, 2665–66 State v. Miller, 2005-1111 (La. 3/10/06), 
923 So. 2d 625 (La. 2006) (striking black prospective juror based on a 5 (of 10) 
rating of the Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s Office); id. at 2904 (same); id. (same); id. 
(same, except based on a 7 rating).  
 173. See, e.g., Peter A. Lyle, Note, Racial Profiling and the Fourth 
Amendment: Applying the Minority Victim Perspective to Ensure Equal 
Protection Under the Law, 21 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 243, 246 (2001) (“This 
combined feeling of anger and dread still resonates deep within the heart of the 
black community. In fact, African Americans have endured an uneasy 
relationship with American law enforcement for decades.”); U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, INVESTIGATION OF THE NEW ORLEANS POLICE 
DEPARTMENT, xix of Executive Summary (Mar. 16, 2011), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/nopd_report.pdf (“[C]ommunity members, 
especially members of racial, ethnic, and language minorities . . . expressed to us 
their deep distrust of and sense of alienation from the police.”). 
 174. See DAVID A. HARRIS, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, DRIVING WHILE 
BLACK: RACIAL PROFILING ON OUR NATION’S HIGHWAYS (1999), available at 
http://www.aclu.org/racial-justice/driving-while-black-racial-profiling-our-nations 
-highways; see also Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 
YALE L.J. 728, 795 (2011) (noting that “calling an African-American man a ‘boy’ 
can be racially derogatory”). 
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burden.”175 This sharing can “create a domino effect of anguish 
and anger rippling across an extended group.”176 The social science 
literature also suggests that these negative attitudes toward the 
police tend to be cumulative, with the initial impression providing 
a durable frame with which future interactions are viewed, and 
influenced by place, with a strong correlation between negative 
police attitudes and neighborhood disadvantage.177 
                                                                                                             
 175. Joe R. Feagin et al., The Many Costs of Discrimination: The Case of 
Middle Class African-Americans, 34 IND. L. REV. 1313, 1331 (2001). 
 176. Id. at 1355; see also Rod K. Brunson, “Police Don’t Like Black 
People”: African American Young Men’s Accumulated Police Experiences, 6 
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 71, 74 (2007) (“Specifically, African-Americans 
and Hispanics were more likely to acquire adverse vicarious information from 
family, friends, and neighbors, whereas whites were apt to receive such reports 
from the media. In addition, [researchers] note that respondents’ original 
assessments of police not only played an important role in how they interpreted 
subsequent personal and vicarious experiences but also helped shape their long-
term attitudes toward police.”).  
 177. Negative attitudes towards the police appear to be strongest among 
black youth. In an effort to explore why, Professors Rod Brunson and Ronald 
Weitzer interviewed forty black teenagers from an inner-city neighborhood 
marked by concentrated poverty. See Brunson, supra note 176, at 71. He found 
that “83% of study participants reported having experienced harassment 
themselves, and 93% reported that someone they knew had been harassed or 
mistreated.” Id. at 80 n.8. Not only did the black youth report feeling over-
policed, but the interactions themselves were a source of animosity, as 
respondents reported harsh and demeaning verbal treatment, and over-
aggressive compliance techniques, such as making the youth lie down on the 
pavement and submit to being searched during routine pedestrian and traffic 
stops. Id. at 83–85. Brunson quotes three of the adolescent respondents who 
collectively shape a troubling portrait of the relationship between those sworn to 
protect and the citizens whom they are supposed to serve:  
“I don’t trip off the police ‘cuz I know they ignorant.” Jermaine replied, 
“It make me feel mad that just looking suspicious will get you pulled 
over.” And Andrew explained, “I start feeling violated sometimes, but 
then I think, nah, that’s something I should expect ‘cuz that’s just the 
police. I figure since they got some authority and can do whatever they 
want to do, they gonna do it.”  
Id. at 87 (emphasis in original). 
The Department of Justice Report on the NOPD echoes this lack of respect 
for the public. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, 
INVESTIGATION OF THE NEW ORLEANS POLICE DEPARTMENT, xix of Executive 
Summary (Mar. 16, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/ 
nopd_report.pdf (“Outside the Department, community members, especially 
members of racial, ethnic, and language minorities, and the LGBT communities, 
expressed to us their deep distrust of and sense of alienation from the police.”); 
id. at 102 (“Minority community groups nearly uniformly said that the police 
rarely reach out to them, for any purpose. One member of a Vietnamese 
community organization reported that ‘[a] lot of the young Vietnamese people 
who get shot in this community, we know who shot them but the New Orleans 
police don’t do anything. They don’t talk to us. They don’t build community 
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Racialized policing in Louisiana contributes to minority group 
members feeling differently about law enforcement.178 In March 
2011, the United States Department of Justice released its findings 
from an extensive civil investigation of the New Orleans Police 
Department (“The Report”). Orleans Parish is just across the 
Crescent City Connection from Jefferson Parish. Orleans is a 
majority-minority community, with a 60.2% black population.179 
“Far too often,” the DOJ Report began, “officers show a lack of 
respect for the civil rights and dignity of the people of New 
Orleans. . . . [T]oo many officers of every rank either do not 
understand or choose to ignore the boundaries of constitutional 
policing.”180 The Report emphasized the “troubling disparities in 
[the] treatment of the City’s African-American community,”181 and 
concluded that the “NOPD . . . failed to take sufficient steps to 
detect, prevent, or address bias-based profiling and other forms of 
discriminatory policing on the basis of race . . . .”182  
                                                                                                             
 
relationships.’”) (alteration in original); id. (citing an anonymous member of 
NOPD’s leadership: “I’m trying to get officers to understand that the public just 
wants to know why they are being detained, the purpose of the citation, what are 
my recourses and just show me some professionalism, and some courtesy, and 
some respect. The public is hungry for this type of interaction.”). 
 178. Racialized policing in New Orleans is not limited to the city’s black 
residents. The DOJ report noted that “NOPD’s lack of a formal and 
comprehensive plan to serve individuals who have limited English proficiency 
results in the provision of inferior and, in some instances, no police assistance to 
a growing segment of the City’s population.” U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE CIVIL 
RIGHTS DIVISION, INVESTIGATION OF THE NEW ORLEANS POLICE DEPARTMENT 
41 (Mar. 16, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/nopd_ 
report.pdf.; see also id. at 41–42 (“No one in the Department was able to 
articulate how NOPD serves LEP residents when one of the “unofficial” 
interpreters is off-duty, in court, or otherwise unavailable.”); id. at 42 (“At one 
community meeting, a monolingual Spanish speaker reported calling police on 
four different nights regarding domestic violence, but receiving a response only 
once. She attributed the lack of response to the Department’s failure to 
understand her. At another meeting, a participant said that she was arrested in 
front of her small child after failing to comprehend and follow an officer’s 
orders.”). 
 179. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, State and County Quick Facts: Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/22/22071.html (last visited 
Oct. 13, 2011). 
 180. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, INVESTIGATION OF THE 
NEW ORLEANS POLICE DEPARTMENT, v of Executive Summary (March 16, 
2011), available at: http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/ nopd_report.pdf. 
 181. Id. at 35. 
 182. Id. at ix of Executive Summary. 
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E. The Detrimental Effects of Prosecutorial Exclusion of African 
Americans 
Discriminatory exclusion impacts not only the stricken jurors 
and the defendant on trial but also “the entire community. 
Selection procedures that purposefully exclude black persons from 
juries undermine public confidence in the fairness of our system of 
justice.”183 Research indicates that the public loses confidence in 
the system when minorities are unfairly excluded from juries. In 
2006, Professor Sam Sommers conducted a mock jury experiment 
aimed at measuring the impact of juror diversity on jury 
deliberations and outcomes.184 He used 200 jury-eligible 
participants, who, with the help of local judges and jury-pool 
administrators, were recruited largely at a Michigan courthouse 
where the jurors had arrived for jury service.185 Sommers first 
divided participants into two types of juries: homogeneous juries 
(six white jurors) and heterogeneous juries (four white jurors and 
two black jurors).186 He then provided each jury with either a race-
neutral or race-salient voir dire questionnaire.187 Next, he showed 
each jury a 30-minute Court-TV video trial summary of a black 
defendant in a sexual assault case.188 Each jury then heard an 
experimenter read jury instructions and remind the jurors that their 
objective was to reach unanimity.189 Finally, Sommers asked each 
jury to deliberate for 60 minutes.190 
Before deliberations, 41% of participants indicated that they 
felt the defendant was guilty.191 30.7% of jurors on heterogeneous 
juries returned guilty verdicts compared to 50.5% of jurors on all-
white juries.192 In the study, white jurors assigned to diverse juries 
returned guilty verdicts less frequently than white jurors serving on 
all white juries.193 Heterogeneous juries also performed better 
across every measure of thoroughness and accuracy: The four 
white and two black juries deliberated longer (50.67 minutes 
                                                                                                             
 183. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1976). 
 184. Sameul R. Sommers, On Racial Diversity and Group Decision Making: 
Identifying Multiple Effects of Racial Composition on Jury Deliberations, 90 J. 
PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 597–612 (2006), available at http://ase.tufts. 
edu/psychology/documents/pubssommersonracialdiversity.pdf. 
 185. Id. at 602. 
 186. Id. at 601. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 602. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. at 603.  
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
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versus 38.49 minutes), discussed more case facts (30.48 versus 
25.93), made fewer factually inaccurate statements (4.14 versus 
7.28), had fewer factual inaccuracies left uncorrected (1.36 versus 
2.49), cited more “missing” evidence (1.87 versus 1.07), raised 
more race-related issues (3.79 versus 2.07), discussed possible 
racism more freely (1.35 versus .93), and displayed less resistance 
at the very mention of racism (22% of comments met with 
resistance versus 100%) than all-white juries.194 While black jurors 
raised race-related issues (e.g. the role of race in police 
investigations) most often, white jurors on diverse, heterogeneous 
juries raised these issues much more frequently than white jurors 
on all-white juries.195 Interestingly, white jurors serving on diverse 
juries raised the possibility of racism more than both black jurors 
and white jurors on all-white juries.196 
Sommers’s results converged with other findings on the effects 
of racial diversity on jury outcomes. Professor William Bowers 
studied 74 capital jury trials involving a black defendant and a white 
victim, and found that juries with four or more white jurors have a 
much higher death sentencing rate than juries with two or more 
black jurors.197 Simply adding a single black male altered the 
deliberation outcomes: juries with no black male members imposed 
death sentences in over 71% of cases.198 When at least one black 
person served on the jury, that number plummeted to 42.9%.199 
Nevertheless, given the trajectory of Louisiana’s Batson 
jurisprudence, prosecutors will remain free to discriminate on the 
basis of race, so long as they do not divulge a race-based reason on 
the record.200 The anti-participation impact appears significant 
where, in many Louisiana parishes, prosecutors are excluding 
African Americans at three or four times the rate of white jurors.201 
Even though the availability of peremptory challenges was not 
originally intended to dilute the participation of racial minorities, it 
has that effect today.  
                                                                                                             
 194. See id. at 605. 
 195. Id. 
 196. See id. at 605–606. 
 197. William J. Bowers et al., Crossing Racial Boundaries: A Closer Look At 
The Roots of Racial Bias in Capital Sentencing When the Defendant is Black 
and the Victim is White, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1497, 1501 (2004). 
 198. William J. Bowers et al., Death-Sentencing in Black and White: An 
Empirical Analysis of the Role of Jurors’ Race and Jury Racial Composition, 3 
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 171, 193 (2001). 
 199. Id.  
 200. See supra Part III.C. The issue becomes even more troublesome because 
there is evidence that prosecutors strike African-American jurors as a result of 
unconscious bias. See infra Part IV.D. 
 201. See supra Part III.B. 
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IV. DEATH-QUALIFICATION 
In cases in which the State seeks the death penalty, prospective 
jurors are “death-qualified.” Experts have summarized the process 
of death-qualification: 
Jury selection in capital cases includes the process of 
“death qualification.” Unless a prospective juror can be 
death qualified s/he will be excluded from the jury. During 
“death qualification” a potential juror is questioned about 
her/his attitudes toward the death penalty. When a potential 
juror’s views on the death penalty will preclude her/him 
from rendering a verdict based on the law and the evidence, 
the juror cannot be “death qualified” and is excluded.202 
In short, death-qualification weeds out those prospective jurors 
whose views on the death penalty––pro or anti––will impair them 
from fairly considering the evidence put forth by the parties. 
A. The Historical Backdrop 
A conscientious objection to a particular law or form of 
punishment was not a basis for a citizen to be excluded from jury 
service either in England or at the formation of the Common Law 
in the United States.203 The formation of the practice of excluding 
jurors who oppose capital punishment from juries in death penalty 
cases has a strong racial component. The 1859 Virginia trial of 
abolitionist John Brown reflects one of the earliest recorded 
instances of “death qualifying” the jury pool.204 Times had 
changed, and slavery states had to fight vigorously against the 
abolitionist movement. John Brown and other “evil-minded and 
traitorous persons” faced trial for “maliciously and feloniously 
advis[ing] slaves to rebel and make insurrection against their 
masters and owners, and against the Government and the 
Constitution and laws of the Commonwealth of Virginia.”205 The 
following question was put to potential jurors: “Have you any 
conscientious scruples against convicting a party of an offense to 
                                                                                                             
 202. Rick Seltzer et al., The Effect of Death-Qualification on the Propensity 
of Jurors to Convict: The Maryland Example, 29 HOW. L.J. 571, 573–74 (1986). 
 203. See, e.g., G. Ben Cohen & Robert J. Smith, The Death of Death-
Qualification, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 87 (2008). 
 204. Id. at n.42 (citing The Trial of John Brown, in THE LIFE, TRIAL AND 
EXECUTION OF CAPTAIN JOHN BROWN KNOWN AS “OLD BROWN OF 
OSSAWATOMIE” WITH A FULL ACCOUNT OF THE ATTEMPTED INSURRECTION AT 
HARPER’S FERRY 55–59 (Mnemosyne Publishing Co. 1969) (1859)).  
 205. Trial of John Brown, supra note 204, at 55–58.  
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which the law assigns the punishment of death, merely because 
that is the penalty assigned?”206 The trial judge and the parties 
must have understood that the “conscientious scruples” of a would-
be abolitionist sympathizer juror could derail the inevitable death 
sentence against John Brown and send the wrong message to 
abolitionists.  
B. Death-Qualification Today 
The scope of death-qualification has narrowed since the trial of 
John Brown. The U.S. Supreme Court, in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 
held that a “sentence of death cannot be carried out if the jury that 
imposed or recommended it was chosen by excluding veniremen 
for cause simply because they voiced general objections to the 
death penalty or expressed conscientious or religious scruples 
against its infliction.”207 Today the process of death-qualification 
means eliminating from the jury any citizen who would be 
“substantially impaired in his or her ability to impose the death 
penalty under the state-law framework.”208 Despite the 
modification in scope, modern death-qualification functions to 
eliminate a disproportionate number of black citizens from jury 
duty in capital cases.  
Death-qualified jurors generally tend to be white.209 This is not 
solely a function of the greater population of white residents, as 
black people are more likely to be eliminated through death-
qualification than are white people based upon attitudes toward 
capital punishment.210 Anecdotal and statistical evidence from two 
recent capital trials in two different Louisiana parishes supports 
that the proposition is true in Louisiana. In State v. Dorsey, a 2009 
capital trial out of Caddo Parish—a parish with a population that is 
                                                                                                             
 206. Id. at 63.  
 207. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522 (1968).  
 208. Uttecht v. Brown, 551 U.S. 1 (2007) (citing Wainwright v. Witt, 469 
U.S. 412, 424 (1985)).  
 209. See Alicia Summers et al., Death Qualification as Systematic Exclusion 
of Jurors With Certain Religious and Other Characteristics, 40 J. APPLIED SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 3218 (2010).  
 210. See Melynda Price, Performing Discretion or Discrimination: Race, 
Ritual, and Peremptory Challenges in Capital Jury Selection, 15 MICH. J. RACE 
& L. 57, 103–04 (2009) (“[P]ersons who oppose the death penalty are not evenly 
distributed throughout the population. As a result, African Americans are more 
likely to be disqualified from service based on attitudes toward the death 
penalty.”); Robert Fitzgerald & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Due Process vs. Crime 
Control: Death Qualification and Jury Attitudes, 8 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 31, 46 
(1984) (finding that death-qualified juries are more likely to exclude women and 
African-American men). 
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49% white and 47% African-American211—only 8 of 36 (22%) 
Witherspoon-qualified jurors were African-American.212 In State v. 
Dressner, out of Jefferson Parish, 25% of black jurors were 
Witherspoon-disqualified compared to 20% of prospective white 
jurors.213 
The anti-participation effects of death-qualification on black 
citizens is particularly troubling given the centrality of citizen-
jurors to the evolving Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. As Justice 
Scalia wrote, dissenting in Roper v. Simmons, “juries maintain a 
link between contemporary community values and the penal 
system that [the] Court cannot claim for itself.”214 Not only are 
black citizens more likely to be excluded from death penalty 
juries215; also, because black citizens constitute a minority 
(number) of citizens, the majority of black citizens who oppose 
capital punishment are unable to exact policy change in 
legislatures.216 What makes the dilution of the black community’s 
                                                                                                             
 211. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, State & Country QuickFacts: Caddo Parish, 
Louisiana, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/22/22017.html (last visited 
Oct. 24, 2011). 
 212. Brief for Appellant at 39, State v. Dorsey (No. 2010-KA-0216) (on file 
with Louisiana Supreme Court and with authors). 
 213. Brief for Appellant at __, State v. Dressner, 45 So. 3d 127 (La. 2010) 
(No. 08-KA-1366) (on file with authors).    
 214. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 616 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(internal quotation omitted); see also Uttecht v. Brown, 551 U.S. 1, 35 (2007) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (highlighting that “[m]illions of Americans oppose the 
death penalty” and that “[a] cross section of virtually every community in the 
country includes citizens who firmly believe the death penalty is unjust but who 
nevertheless are qualified to serve as jurors in capital cases”); Baze v. Rees, 553 
U.S. 35, 84 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“The prosecutorial concern that 
death verdicts would rarely be returned by 12 randomly selected jurors should 
be viewed as objective evidence supporting the conclusion that the penalty is 
excessive.”); Cohen & Smith, supra note 203, at 120–21 (“Death-qualification 
eliminates from juries those citizens who would find a death sentence to be cruel 
and unusual either generally or in a particular context. As a result, when 
appellate courts review the frequency with which juries impose a death sentence 
for a certain class of capital crimes, that measure is necessarily an inaccurate 
thermometer for determining how much a society has chilled to the idea of 
executing a certain class of offenders.”). 
 215. Even when African-American prospective jurors are death-qualified, 
their responses during death-qualification, which may indicate some hesitation 
towards handing out capital punishment, render them susceptible to being struck 
peremptorily. See Price, supra note 210, at 100–01. 
 216. See Adam M. Clark, An Investigation of Death Qualification as a 
Violation of the Rights of Jurors, 24 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 49–50 (2006) 
(“Taken together, the unequal numbers in executions, and in excludable death 
penalty beliefs, mean that the most powerful members of society are deciding 
whether the death penalty should be allowed, who should be executed, and who 
should be allowed to participate in the decision process. Those who are opposed 
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voice even more troubling is that the fact that black citizens in 
Louisiana––and nationally––tend to disapprove of capital 
punishment relative to white citizens is not accidental or random: 
African Americans who remember slavery and lynching, or who 
live in areas where racial profiling and police intimidation are still 
the norms, are often reticent to impose a death sentence.217 
C. The Reasons Many African Americans Are Not Death-Qualified 
are Attributable to State Action 
The link between the death penalty and historical lynching 
likely influences the attitudes of black citizens on capital 
punishment. Between 1882 and 1968, close to 5,000 Americans 
were lynched, overwhelmingly in Southern states.218 Three out of 
every four victims were black.219 There were 95 reported lynchings 
in Louisiana between 1889 and 1896, the victim was black in 
roughly 85% of those cases.220 The noose evokes images of fear, 
intimidation, brutality, hatred, bigotry, mob rule, and 
lawlessness—the ugliest aspects of a racial past we would like to 
believe we have overcome. The powerful images of lynching 
continue to surface today. In September 2007, the nation’s 
attention turned to the small town of Jena, Louisiana where 20,000 
people assembled to protest the prosecution of six young black 
men. Many heralded the moment as an opportunity to revitalize the 
civil rights movement and to reawaken a new generation to the 
racial bias and unequal treatment that continues to taint our 
                                                                                                             
 
to the death penalty are not only in a minority group by belief, but in the power 
to effect change in society. They are deprived of the legislative means to end the 
death penalty due to social weakness, and then also deprived of access to the 
jury, the last forum which could be of use to them.”). 
 217. See, e.g., Price, supra note 210, at 103–04; see also David C. Baldus et 
al., The Use of Peremptory Challenges in Capital Murder Trials: A Legal and 
Empirical Analysis, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 3, 19 n.40 (2001). 
 218. Charles J. Ogletree, Black Man’s Burden: Race and the Death Penalty 
in America, 81 OR. L. REV. 15 (2002) (noting that “the Tuskegee Institute 
estimates that nearly 5,000 lynchings took place between 1882 and 1968”). 
 219. See, e.g., Sarah A. Soule, Populism and Black Lynching in Georgia, 
1890–1900, 71 SOC. F. 431, 431 (1992–1993) (noting that 78% of lynching 
victims across the United States between 1889–1900 were black). 
 220. James M. Inverarity, Populism and Lynching in Louisiana, 1889–1896: 
A Test of Erikson's Theory of the Relationship between Boundary Crises and 
Repressive Justice, 41 AM. SOC. REV. 262, 263 tbl. 1 (1976). 
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society.221 The incident began when a group of white students 
hung several hangman’s nooses under a tree in the high school 
yard.222 
Racial tensions at the high school already were high. After 
white students allegedly hurled racial epithets at black students, a 
fight broke out, and a white student was kicked and punched by a 
group of six black students. The white student briefly lost 
consciousness. These black students—a bunch that included 
honors students and star athletes—were initially prosecuted for 
attempted murder. No charges were pressed against the white 
students who placed the noose in the yard. In an op-ed piece 
published in the New York Times the local District Attorney, Reed 
Walters, acknowledged the source of the outrage, writing “I can 
understand the emotions generated by the juxtaposition of the 
noose incident with the attack on Mr. Barker and the outcomes for 
the perpetrators of each.”223 He continued: 
I cannot overemphasize how abhorrent and stupid I find the 
placing of the nooses on the schoolyard tree in late August 
2006. If those who committed that act considered it a 
prank, their sense of humor is seriously distorted. It was 
mean-spirited and deserves the condemnation of all decent 
people. But it broke no law. I searched the Louisiana 
criminal code for a crime that I could prosecute. There is 
none.224 
A joke is exactly how two Jefferson Parish assistant district 
attorneys described their actions when, in 2003, they wore neckties 
depicting a hangman’s noose and grim reaper to the death penalty 
                                                                                                             
 221. See, e.g., Anthony V. Alfieri, Prosecuting the Jena Six, 93 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1285, 1292 (2008); Joseph Kennedy, The Jena Six, Mass Incarceration, 
and the Remoralization of Civil Rights, 44 HARV. C.R.–C.L. L. REV. 477 (2009). 
 222. Jeannine Bell, The Hangman's Noose and the Lynch Mob: Hate Speech 
and the Jena Six, 44 HARV. C.R.–C.L. L. REV. 329, 329 (2009) (“The 
controversy in Jena, Louisiana began innocently enough. On August 30, 2006, 
administrators at Jena High School held an assembly to discuss rules and 
policies for the upcoming year. According to reports, at the end of the assembly 
one Black student asked the assistant principal whether Black students were 
allowed to sit under the tree in the center of campus. In a description of the 
events, a reporter from The Jena Times noted that the question was asked in a 
joking manner and that all students, both Black and White, recognized the 
question as a joke and laughed. The vice principal told them that they could sit 
where they want. The next day, nooses were found hanging from a tree in the 
center of the high school’s campus.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 223. Reed Walters, Editorial, Justice in Jena, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2007), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/26/opinion/26walters.htm. 
 224. Id. 
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trial of a boy who was only sixteen years old at the time of the 
crime. The father of the defendant found the ties, especially the 
noose, to be clearly racist, saying “I mean, who else got strung 
up?”225 
The noose is not the only symbol that reopens the wounds of 
racialized violence and inequality. In the four decades since he 
arrived in Louisiana, Carl Staples had not been called for jury duty 
a single time.226 On May 11, 2009, Mr. Staples appeared at the 
court, after finally being called to serve.227 Outside the main 
entrance to the courthouse, the Confederate flag welcomed visitors 
and veterans of the court alike. 
During jury selection in a death penalty case, Mr. Staples 
explained to the court why that Confederate flag left him unable to 
take part in the administration of justice: 
[The flag is] a symbol of one of the most, to me, one of the 
most heinous crimes ever committed to another member of 
the human race and I just don’t see how you could say . . . 
you’re here for justice and then again you continue to 
overlook this great injustice by continuing to fly this flag 
which continues to . . . put salt in the wounds . . . of people 
of color. I don’t buy it. I don’t buy it.228  
The Assistant District Attorney successfully moved to strike 
Mr. Staples from the jury for cause (meaning that his opinion 
rendered him unqualified to serve as a juror).229 These symbols, the 
noose and the Confederate flag, remind black citizens of the 
savage inequalities that the state and federal government tolerated 
(and even promoted).230 Unfortunately, these insults are not 
                                                                                                             
 225. Jeffrey Gettleman, Prosecutors’ Morbid Neckties Stir Criticism, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 5, 2003, at A14. 
 226. See, e.g., Cecelia Trenicosta & William C. Collins, Death and Dixie: 
How the Courthouse Confederate Flag Influences Capital Cases in Louisiana, 
27 HARV. J. ON RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 125 (2011), available at  http://papers. 
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isolated events, but the type of pain that is likely to be experienced 
over and over again throughout one’s life.231 
D. The Detrimental Effects of Excluding African-American Jurors 
from Death Penalty Trials 
The exclusion of black citizens from juries is likely to blame, at 
least in part, for the disparities that continue to exist in criminal 
sentencing in Louisiana. Justice Scalia has referred to the 
“undeniable reality” that “all groups tend to have particular 
sympathies and hostilities—most notably, sympathies toward their 
own group members.”232 This phenomenon is known as ingroup 
bias. Professor Jerry Kang writes that “[i]ngroup bias is so strong 
that people explicitly report liking ‘ingroups’ even when they are 
randomly assigned to them . . . [and] even when the groups are 
made up.”233 The lack of representation of one’s own race on a 
jury can be detrimental in two ways. First, white jurors might 
sympathize with white victims more than they do black victims. 
This might contribute to the race of the victim effect recently 
documented in Caddo and East Baton Rouge Parishes. It might 
also inhibit white jurors from experiencing an empathic response 
to mitigating evidence presented by black defendants.  
There is some experimental evidence to bolster the 
explanation. A recent study used transcranial magnetic stimulation 
(TMS) to measure corticospinal activity level in participants who 
were shown short video clips of a needle entering into the hand of 
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 232. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 424 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 233. Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing Through Colorblindness: Implicit 
Bias and the Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 465, n.37 (2010). 
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either a white or black target.234 Consistent with the ingroup 
empathic bias explanation, researchers here found that region 
specific brain activity levels are higher when a white participant 
views the clip of a white participant experiencing pain than when a 
white target sees a clip of a black target being subjected to pain.235 
Significantly brain activity level ratings in response to witnessing 
outgroup member pain correlates with a participant's score on the 
Implicit Association Test, which the authors interpreted as 
evidence that this neuro-response is culturally learned rather than 
automatic.236  
The second disadvantage that flows from the exclusion of 
black jurors in capital trials is that white jurors might treat black 
defendants more harshly. Thus, as Justice Thomas explained in 
Georgia v. McCollum, “securing representation of the defendant’s 
race on the jury may help to overcome racial bias and provide the 
defendant with a better chance of having a fair trial.”237 One reason 
why black citizens receive harsher punishments is because of the 
perception that blacks are both less than human and prone to 
violence.238 Prosecutors play into these stereotypes by referring to 
defendants in animalistic terms. For example, in Darden v. 
Wainwright,239 the Court noted the prosecution’s reference to the 
capital defendant in that case as an “animal” that “shouldn’t be out 
of his cell unless he has a leash on him.” Other instances include 
references to “animals” who armed themselves to shoot “white 
honkies,”240 a “blood crazed animal who hovered over [the 
victim’s] grave,”241 and a “pervert, a weasel and a moron” “who 
raped his mother’s friend, would rape a dog and would rape each 
and every member of the jury.”242 In a recent Louisiana case,243 the 
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prosecution referred to the black capital defendant as “[a]nimals 
like that (indicating)” and implored the jury to “be a voice for the 
people of this Parish” and to “send a message to that jungle.”244  
The use of animal imagery in reference to the accused stirs up 
the exact type of emotional response that the Supreme Court 
indicated trial courts should take pains to avoid: the kind that 
allows citizens to stop pondering the accused as an individual 
human being.245 Again, there is experimental evidence that non-
human references to capital defendants influences the severity of 
the punishment imposed. Working from a dataset of more than 600 
capital cases that proceeded to the penalty phase in Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania between 1979 and 1999, Professors Philip Goff and 
Jennifer Eberhardt measured the frequency of dehumanizing, 
animalistic references to black capital defendants with similar 
references to white death-eligible defendants.246 The results are 
disturbing. Press coverage of black capital defendants (from the 
Philadelphia Inquirer) included, on average, nearly four times the 
number of dehumanizing references per article than articles 
covering white capital defendants. More disturbing still, there is a 
direct and strong correlation between the number of times an 
animalistic reference was made and the likelihood that the 
defendant was sentenced to death.247 The increased presence of 
black jurors could help offset the destructive impact.  
V. THE INTER-RELATEDNESS OF NON-UNANIMOUS JURY VERDICTS, 
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES, AND DEATH QUALIFICATION 
Each of the policies discussed above, as well as the practices that 
continue in part because of the residual impact of those policies, 
independently denigrate the quality of justice administered in 
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Louisiana by disproportionately excluding the voice of black 
citizens. Worse, these policies and practices are mutually 
reinforcing, creating cycles of exclusion. The most powerful voices 
in the legislature—and most of the time their most powerful 
constituents—do not live in areas of concentrated poverty and 
violence. The legislature makes laws, many fear-based, to punish 
and protect against violence that occurs in many of the areas where 
the legacy of slavery and second-class citizenship have created 
intergenerational poverty among citizens of color. Citizens are 
called to judge defendants charged with violating these laws, but 
prosecutors successfully eliminate many people of color through 
discriminatory jury selection even though many live in the areas 
where the crimes are committed, understand the police conduct in 
those areas, and live with the situational pressures and constraints 
that define such locations. 
Consider how the cycle of exclusion feeds itself. Suppose a 
particular neighborhood is disproportionately poor. Historical 
discrimination has resulted in intergenerational poverty, low levels 
of education, and high unemployment rates among African 
Americans. These disadvantages result in a clustering of African 
Americans in the neighborhood. The comparative socioeconomic 
disadvantage of the neighborhood drives elevated crime rates. In 
turn, law enforcement increases patrolling of the area. Although 
blacks and whites use drugs at comparable rates, the increased 
police presence results in more arrests of black citizens from drug 
offenses.  
In Louisiana, possession of marijuana is a misdemeanor 
offense.248 However, if a person is arrested for marijuana 
possession, second offense, the district attorney possesses the 
discretion to choose whether to charge the crime again as a “first 
offense,” resulting only in a misdemeanor conviction, or the 
prosecutor can choose to charge the same possession as a 
marijuana “second offense,” which is a felony that carries a 
maximum of five years imprisonment.249 This discretion exists 
regardless of the amount of marijuana involved. When the 
prosecutor is faced with the decision of whether to charge the 
marijuana possession as a misdemeanor or a felony, the point that 
the offender comes from a neighborhood of concentrated crime 
likely weighs on her mind. Furthermore, as the prosecutor reviews 
the case file of the black offender, stereotypes of blacks as crime-
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prone and dangerous, might influence the decision of how to 
charge the crime.  
After the offender is charged with marijuana second and 
convicted of a felony, the felon juror exclusion rule operates to 
cabin the influence of black citizens in the jury box. Louisiana law 
prohibits a citizen who has been “convicted of a felony for which 
he has not been pardoned” from serving as a juror on a criminal 
jury.250 Although the Louisiana constitution mandates full 
restoration of the “rights of citizenship” upon “termination of state 
and federal supervision following conviction for any offense,”251 
the Louisiana Supreme Court does not consider jury service to be a 
right of citizenship.252 Thus, skewed enforcement of criminal laws 
(for example, disproportionate arrests for drug possession crime 
despite equal rates of drug use) has the collateral consequence of 
excluding a disproportionate number of black citizens from jury 
service.  
Those black citizens that are not excluded from jury service by 
felon exclusion laws, and are able to find the transportation and 
childcare to get to the district courthouse, are often excluded by 
prosecutors through peremptory challenges or death-qualification. 
Even if a black juror or two is selected onto the jury, the 10-2 
verdict rule effectively silences their vote in most Louisiana 
Parishes. When the convicted defendant is sent away, families 
struggle to make up for lost income and support. When he has 
served his time and is released, the convicted citizen will face 
seemingly insurmountable obstacles in finding even the most 
menial of work. The cycle of poverty and instability persists, and 
with a felony record, ex-offenders cannot participate to effectuate 
change by sitting in judgment of another defendant on a criminal 
jury. Discrimination by design has contributed to self-sustaining 
structural inequality.  
Rather than fight these battles one-by-one, we should seriously 
consider how to effect systemic change. The most obvious 
suggestions are to eliminate non-unanimous jury verdicts, 
eliminate felony enhancement provisions for status or other minor 
offenses, craft effective mechanisms for eliminating race-
motivated jury selection (or else abolish peremptory challenges), 
and restore the right to serve on a jury, a basic right of citizenship, 
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to all ex-offenders. A few discrete alterations cannot solve the race 
disparity problems in Louisiana; the larger project requires massive 
shifts in the economic, social, and cultural landscape that could 
only be accomplished in the long term. Yet, these potential 
remedies are cost-effective ways to move in the right direction.  
Closing the 1898 Constitutional Convention, E.B. Kruttschnitt 
provided solace for those terrified of what the Reconstruction 
Amendments meant for the supremacy of the white race in 
Louisiana:  
I say to you, that we can appeal to the conscience of the 
nation, both judicial and legislative and I don’t believe that 
they will take the responsibility of striking down the system 
which we have reared in order to protect the purity of the 
ballot box and to perpetuate the supremacy of the Anglo-
Saxon race in Louisiana.253 
As residents of states across the nation pat themselves on the 
back for maintaining justice systems that at least pretend to operate 
on a different plane than justice systems in the Deep South, we ask 
the same question that Kruttschnitt asked more than a century ago: 
Who will take responsibility for striking down the system? 
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